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Abstract 
Metaphorical phrases like ‘seeing red’ in anger or ‘red-hot’ for temperature take abstract ideas and 
ground them more tangible, physical phenomena, suggesting a relationship between semantic 
meaning and visual attributes. We tested the dominant direction of influence between abstract 
semantic processing and visual perception by pairing words and visual attributes in the same 
stimulus. Semantic categorization was used to test if visual attributes moderate semantic decisions by 
including both congruent and incongruent pairings with visual attributes. For instance, categorizing 
‘scald’ in red font colour as hot (congruent) can be compared to ‘scald’ in blue font colour 
(incongruent), or ‘freeze’ in red font colour (incongruent) to determine if visual attributes (e.g., 
colour) automatically affect semantic decisions. Using the same stimuli, visual attribute 
categorization (e.g., categorizing ‘scald’ as red) was used to test if word meaning automatically 
affects perceptual decisions. Experiment 1 included mad (red congruent) and sad (blue congruent) 
emotion words, whereby semantic categorization revealed consistent congruency effects (i.e., shorter 
RTs and fewer errors with congruent trials than incongruent trials), but not with colour 
categorization. Experiment 2 extended these effects to the domain of temperature, including hot (red 
congruent) and cold (blue congruent) temperature words. Semantic categorization revealed consistent 
congruency effects on RT and errors, but not with colour naming. Experiment 3 extended 
Experiment 2 by including the neutral colour green. In semantic categorization, congruent pairs 
showed facilitation relative to neutral, and incongruent pairs showed interference relative to neutral, 
whereas only facilitation occurred with colour categorization for red-hot pairs. These results support 
the obligatory processing of visual attributes in semantic tasks, grounding abstract semantic meaning 
in colour processing. In the reverse direction, colour categorization tasks also showed semantic 
influences, although smaller and less consistently. Experiment 4 tested the generality of these effects 
in the visual domain of time processing. Congruent and incongruent pairs were generated by 
combining short durations and long durations with temporally associated words (e.g., ‘brief,’ 
‘eternal’). Congruency effects occurred consistently on RTs and error rates for the duration 
categorization (revealing semantic influences), but only consistently on errors with semantic 
categorization. Thus, word meaning serves as the dominant attribute in the domain of time, indicating 
varying strengths of automaticity between visual attributes. These experiments explore the generality 
and boundary conditions of how visual attributes, like colour and time perception, and word meaning 
share representations, whereby asymmetries provide new evidence regarding the automatic direction 
of processing influences in these domains.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Review of Literature 
 How do we describe our subjective experiences to others when they are unique and 
personal? Philosophers describe qualia as ‘what it is like’ to experience such mental states as 
seeing red, feeling heat, smelling cinnamon, or hearing a burst of thunder. Dennett (1988) argues 
that such qualia are ineffable, that is, they cannot be effectively communicated by means other 
than direct experience. And yet, we meaningfully describe our experiences with each other quite 
regularly. Moreover, the language we use is often more abstract than basic qualia, for instance in 
describing a warm exchange between close friends. Here, warm and close are not literal 
descriptors, but they capture an abstract, figurative quality of friendship that two people share. 
The way we use language to communicate these experiences reveals a relationship between 
experience and semantic comprehension. Although the common use of these metaphors suggests 
a unique relationship between semantic meaning and perceptual representations, it remains 
unclear how such physical attributes may relate to semantic knowledge. To examine the 
cognitive architecture of this relationship, and its possible mechanism(s), four studies are 
presented describing the interactions that occur in making perceptual or semantic decisions while 
simultaneously processing related perceptual and semantic cues.  
1.1 Semantic Organization and Language Comprehension 
 Semantic memory is broadly defined as a part of long-term memory involving the 
meaning of a word or phrase, and concepts that describe worldly knowledge (Tulving, 1972; 
Martin, 2001). Semantic knowledge is thought to be represented across a network (Thompson-
Schill, Kan & Oliver, 2006), where accessing or engaging semantic memory involves spreading 
activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975). For instance, a search through the semantic network may 
begin with activating a conceptual node (e.g., ‘hot’), which then spreads activation to related, or 
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‘nearby’ concepts (e.g., ‘fire,’ ‘red’) until a goal is satisfied like finding a related item, or 
verifying some relationship between facts. Before discussing theories of semantic organization 
further, it should be noted the terms semantic and conceptual are used interchangeably. This is 
because authors tend to describe ‘conceptual representations’ in regards to theories of semantic 
organization (e.g., Barsalou, 1999), while using ‘semantic representations’ in experimental 
studies of semantic organization (e.g., Martin, 2001), while both describe the meaning of words 
and their referents.  
The organization of semantic memory is mainly described in two ways. In one prominent 
model, concepts are organized by logical, hierarchical relationships (Quillian, 1968), whereby 
propositions that are true of all members of a concept (e.g., living things) are stored at the top at 
a superordinate category level. Propositions true of some members (e.g., animals have muscle, 
but not plants) are stored at lower levels, until facts that are true of only one member are stored 
within the individual concept (e.g., stripes of a zebra). While this model predicts faster 
verification of facts about individual concepts (e.g., zebras have stripes versus animals have 
muscles), the evidence does not consistently favor this model (e.g., McCloskey & Glucksberg, 
1979). Alternatively, the semantic network may be organized based on the related features of 
concepts (Rips, Shoben & Smith, 1973), where the number of shared features between concepts 
(or typicality of a member) reflects category membership. This graded category membership 
finds stronger support, as more typical members of categories (e.g., a robin is a bird) are verified 
faster than less typical members (e.g., a chicken is a bird). Their model posits two stages, the first 
assesses very high or low overall familiarity of characteristic and defining features together for 
fast responses (e.g., a salmon is a fish: ‘yes,’ a salmon is a bird: ‘no’). The second stage 
processes cases requiring specifically defining features (e.g., a whale is a fish: ‘no’), taking more 
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time to respond. Support for this model indicates responding is based on similarity of features 
between members, rather than a hierarchical model. 
The notions of typicality and similarity between member features within categories still 
raise questions about the format of semantic representation, and it has been debated whether 
these representations are amodal (e.g., propositional or symbolic; e.g., Caramazza & Shelton, 
1998; Plaut, 1999), or involve modal representations with motor, visual, or tactile processes (e.g., 
Allport, 1985; Pulvermuller, 1999). Standard theories of cognition describe the semantic network 
as amodal, where network activation and concepts are represented symbolically in an abstract, 
non-modular system, that is, with little or no relation to the experience of those concepts in 
perception, action, or introspection (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1981, 1984; Zwaan, 1999; see Barsalou & 
Hale, 1993, for a review). For instance, Tulving (1972) argues that input to semantic memory 
begins perceptually in experience, although the representation of perceptual properties 
themselves are not stored in semantic memory. Rather, new abstract representations are formed 
with no relation to the original experience (Pylyshyn, 1984). As such, no simulation in 
perceptual or sensorimotor processes would occur when retrieving a concept (Mahon & 
Caramazza, 2008).  
 On the other hand, some theorists argue that semantic knowledge is shared with 
perceptual processes (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Kan, Barsalou, Solomon, Minor, & Thompson-Schill, 
2003). As early as Locke (1690), philosophers have hypothesized a modal relationship between 
knowledge and experience: “Whence comes [the mind] by that vast store, which the busy and 
boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? … To this I answer, in 
one word, From experience.” Such musings have inspired psychologists to map the interface 
between semantics and experience. Under this view, different attribute domains in semantic 
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knowledge are supported by separate brain regions, from colour and motion, to action and 
abstract representations (Allport, 1985, Gibbs, 2005). In describing the relationship between 
experience and semantic memory, I will use the word perception in the broad sense to capture 
perceptual representation in memory. In this way, perception encompasses early perceptual input 
(e.g., differential activation of cones in the retina due to different wavelengths of light), its 
simulation (e.g., imagine the colour red), and perceptual judgments (e.g., responding ‘red’ as 
your judgment of the colour you perceived). 
Grounded cognition rejects the traditional amodal view, positing the central role of 
experiential simulation in cognition (Barsalou, 2008). According to grounded cognition theory, 
simulations reenact perceptual, motor, and introspective states that occurred during the original 
experience within the environment, supporting action, perception, and semantic representations. 
For instance, Allport (1985) describes the distributed, sensorimotor representation of a telephone, 
involving action (e.g., grasping), tactile (e.g., hard, smooth), spatiomotor (e.g., near the ear, 
lightweight), visual (e.g., dark, reflective), and auditory (e.g., voice, dial tone) elements. 
Prominent evidence of grounded cognition can be seen across different modalities, broadly 
categorized into visual or functional domains. For instance, in action-perception, Masson, Bub, 
and Breuer (2011) showed that seeing an object (e.g., mug, pan) automatically triggered 
participants to simulate grasping and functional actions, but only when the handle was positioned 
for its functional action. In vision, Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, and Gegenfurtner (2006) found 
evidence that participants simulate an object’s natural colour (e.g., a yellow banana), when 
viewing achromatic objects (e.g., a gray banana), as their perceived colour shifted towards the 
opponent colour (i.e., a bluish banana). Indeed, after tiring from a run, a hill may look steeper, 
and after wearing a heavy pack, a path may look longer, arguably because the simulated effort to 
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traverse these obstacles is greater (Proffitt, 2006). Thus, grounded cognition and distributed 
semantic-sensorimotor representations provide a model of embodied cognition, linking 
perceptual and semantic domains in simulation. 
Specific to language, a model of semantic memory must also include more abstract 
concepts like emotion or time. Metaphors, in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or 
action that is not literally applicable, exemplify how abstract semantic meaning and domains of 
perception are often related. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) argue that metaphors recruit mental 
imagery from sensorimotor domains to support semantic representations. An example of a 
primary metaphor they use is ‘understanding as grasping.’ Here, ‘grasping’ an idea, or a concept 
going ‘over one’s head’ uses physical object manipulation (or lack there of) as a proxy for the 
abstract idea of comprehension. Primary metaphors have a minimal structure of cross-domain 
attributes, relating abstract concepts (e.g., ‘understanding’) and more concrete, often 
sensorimotor attributes (.e.g., ‘grasping’; Grady, 1997). Other primary metaphors include 
‘intimacy as closeness,’ or ‘time as motion’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). According to metaphor 
representation theory, the example that nice people are ‘sweet’ is not because they are literally 
sweet (and would not be if eaten!), but because interacting with nice people and eating sweet 
foods are similarly pleasant (Meier, Moeller, Reimer-Peltz, & Robinson, 2012).  
In the embodied theory of language comprehension, Zwaan (2004) further maintains that 
concepts employ simulation in supporting semantic representations. For instance, Zwaan and 
Yaxley (2003) showed participants were faster to identify that words were semantically related 
(e.g., attic, basement), when spatially oriented as expected (i.e., attic on top, basement on 
bottom) compared to the reverse. Similarly, read words like ‘kick’ are shown to activate 
overlapping regions of the brain that are also active during the word’s referenced perception or 
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action (Kan et al. 2003; Pulvermüller, 1999). In addition, when comprehending language, hand 
and eye movements are shown to be consistent with the described situation (Glenberg & Gallese, 
2012). Overall, such findings bring strong evidence of simulation in semantic comprehension, 
and demonstrate how metaphors and simulation are not simply by-products of language, but are 
central to supporting semantic representation and cognition. 
How might these metaphorical relationships and the embodiment of semantics develop? 
Johnson’s (1996) theory of conflation proposes that, in the course of learning, young children do 
not distinguish between the two meanings in commonplace metaphors. The idea that ‘affection is 
warmth’, or ‘intimacy is closeness’, regularly co-occur in language. Young children identify this 
covariation and, at first, understand these concepts as the same, only separating them in a later 
period of differentiation. Through this mechanism of conflation, these associations become 
automatic, and persist even after they are distinguished. Similarly, Piaget and Inhelder (1969) 
take the developmental perspective that cognition first operates on sensorimotor representations 
before more abstract concepts. Because abstract thought develops later, it recruits and is built on 
sensorimotor representations, fundamentally linking perceptual-conceptual pairings into 
adulthood. A compelling demonstration of primary metaphor operating at the perceptual level 
involves the ‘good is bright, bad is dark’ metaphor (Meier, Robinson, & Clore, 2004). 
Participants were faster to categorize words as positively valenced when presented in white, 
compared to black, and faster to categorize words as negatively valenced when presented in 
black, compared to white. However, identifying the presented colour as black or white with the 
same stimuli did not show this congruency effect, revealing the automatic perceptual-conceptual 
relationship with this metaphor.  
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1.2 Perception and Semantic Processing Conflict 
A related literature describes the reverse direction, whereby semantic processing 
automatically modulates performance on a perceptual task. A classic example is the Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935), which was originally used to compare colour naming solid squares to colour 
words written in mismatched coloured ink (e.g., ‘red’ in blue ink, or ‘blue’ in green ink). 
Participants were significantly delayed in colour naming words written incongruently compared 
to colour naming squares, indicating interference from reading words.  
Stroop effects occur when a natural relationship occurs between the carrier word’s 
referent and its physical attribute, such that congruent and incongruent pairs occur (Algom, 
Chajut, & Lev, 2004). As MacLeod (1992) describes, Stroop effects are a critical measure of 
attentional capacity. Cattell (1886) first reported that word-reading was faster than naming 
objects and their properties (like colour) aloud. When Stroop (1935) demonstrated that words 
produce interference when they co-occurred with colour, it was further evidence that word-
reading was more automatic, demanding less attention resources, and that colour-naming was 
more controlled, or voluntary.  
Since this landmark study, evidence supports the locus of this interaction at both semantic 
and response stages of processing (Zhang & Kornblum, 1998). For instance, Klein (1964) found 
that participants named the colour of rare words faster than common words, and common words 
faster than colour-related words like ‘grass’ in red ink and ‘lemon’ in blue ink, supporting the 
semantic relatedness of colour words with colour representations. Similarly, Lorentz, McKibben, 
Ekstrand, Gould, Anton, and Borowsky (2016) found a semantically based Stroop effect with 
colour-associated words after controlling for word-reading processes (e.g., pseudohomophones 
that sound like words versus actual words) and contingency effects (differences in repeating 
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congruent conditions more often than incongruent conditions). By mapping multiple colour 
responses to the same button, Zhang and Kornblum (1998) also showed that participants were 
slower to identify the colour of incongruent words (e.g., ‘red’ in green ink), than congruent 
words (e.g., ‘red’ in red ink), even when both red and green responses mapped to the same 
button. This ‘stimulus-stimulus’ conflict between word and colour supports a semantic source of 
conflict during a perceptual task.  
Interestingly, word-reading such incongruent stimuli (e.g., ‘red’ in green font) compared 
to neutral (e.g., ‘red’ in black font) does not produce the same conflict compared to colour 
naming (Stroop, 1935; see MacLeod, 1991, for a review). These results further support the 
dominance of semantic processing, leading theorists to posit that semantic access in word-
reading with skilled readers is automatic (e.g., Dagenbach, Carr, & Wilhelmsen, 1989; LaBerge 
& Samuels, 1974; Neely; 1977; see Carr, 1992 for a review). Still, some argue word-reading is 
not purely automatic, because reducing the scope of attention (e.g., only colouring one letter; 
Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier; 1997, or presenting distractor words; Kahneman & Chajczyk, 1983) 
can mitigate some of the Stroop effect. Even so, the robustness of Stroop effects among its many 
variants supports rapid and minimal effort in accessing semantic representations when reading, 
providing evidence of semantic dominance in these perceptual tasks.  
Although many studies suggest asymmetries between perceptual and semantic 
processing, Richter and Zwaan (2009) provided evidence that colour perception and semantic 
processing may share underlying representations in a bidirectional relationship using two tasks. 
First, they demonstrated that lexical decisions on colour words were faster when preceded by a 
congruent colour than an incongruent colour, indicating a link from perceptual processing to 
semantic representation. Second, they found that a colour discrimination task was also speeded 
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when a congruent colour word (e.g., ‘red’) was presented between the two similarly shaded 
colours. These results indicated that colour representations are activated when processing colour 
words, supporting the simulation account of language comprehension, in addition to colours 
priming semantic activation.  
Overall, evidence for influences between perceptual and semantic representations comes 
from two perspectives. During semantic tasks, grounded cognition supports the dominance of 
perceptual processes supporting semantic representation through simulation and embodiment 
(Barsalou, 2008; Zwaan, 2004) as well as basic metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). During 
perceptual categorization tasks, in the reverse direction, evidence also supports shared 
representations through the automatic processing of semantic cues (Lorentz et al. 2016; Klein, 
1964; Zhang & Kornblum, 1998). While most studies find dominance of one representation (i.e., 
perceptual or conceptual), with bidirectional effects shown occasionally (e.g., Richter & Zwaan, 
2009), much of the relative dominance (and degree of directional influence) remains to be 
explored in terms of when one modality will more strongly influence another.  
Grounded cognition suggests that the more abstract a concept is, the more it may recruit 
perceptual or bodily processes, and thus the easier a semantic task may be completed when 
related attributes are present (e.g., faster; more accurately). In the reverse direction, the 
automaticity of word reading suggests rapid access to semantic knowledge, which may 
subsequently activate perceptual or bodily simulation. Although these effects are relatively well 
explored with literal Stroop items like colour and colour-associated words (e.g., ‘red,’ or 
‘lemon,’; Anton et al. 2014; Klein, 1964; Lorentz et al. 2016; Richter & Zwaan, 2009) as well as 
actions and objects (e.g., ‘mug,’ or ‘attic’; Masson et al. 2011; Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003), these 
effects are less understood with more abstract concepts. In particular, the evidence is still lacking 
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as to when one representation (perceptual or semantic) may be more dominant with metaphor-
based concepts related to perceptual processes.  
In order to test the source dominance of perceptual and conceptual representations in 
more abstract associations, the following four studies combine related semantic and perceptual 
attributes while manipulating the task-relevant attribute. The logic of these four experiments 
involves an exploration of three semantic domains. In Experiment 1, the concept of emotion, 
involving the ‘red is mad’ and ‘blue is sad’ metaphor will be tested using mad and sad associated 
words presented in red or blue. Experiment 2 explores the abstract association of temperature 
and colour, involving the ‘hot is red’ and ‘cold is blue’ metaphor, extending the effects found in 
the domain of emotion. Next, Experiment 3 employs the colour green as a neutral baseline to test 
the effects of facilitation and interference with temperature and colour associations, separately. 
Finally, using the ‘time is space’ and ‘time is motion’ metaphor, Experiment 4 tested the 
relationship of time-associated concepts with time-perception to examine the generality of the 
perceptual-conceptual link. The results of these four studies are discussed in relation to the above 
literature, demonstrating both generality and boundary conditions to the dominant processing of 
perceptual and conceptual information sources. 
Chapter 2: Emotion Stroop Experiment 
 This chapter is based on the following manuscript in revision with Cognition and 
Emotion. The chapter has been edited to ensure consistency with the thesis. 
Lorentz, E., Gould., L., Ekstrand., E., Mickleborough. M., & Borowsky. R. (2016). Feeling blue’ 
and ‘seeing red’: Evidence grounding discrete emotions in colour perception from a Stroop 
paradigm. Under review at Cognition and Emotion.  
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When describing the subjective experience of emotion, we often borrow language from 
the perceptual domain, including ‘feeling blue’ for sadness and ‘seeing red’ for anger, in an 
attempt to connect these experiences to the real world (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). Such 
expressions suggest that these emotion words in the semantic network are grounded in more 
concrete perceptual experiences like colour processing (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Williams, 
Huang, & Bargh, 2009). For example, simulating the concept of anger may draw on observed or 
produced aggressive actions (Berkowitz, 1993), as well as perceived flush expression that occur 
when someone is angry (Changizi et al. 2006). Along similar lines in this perspective, the 
spreading activation of a concept like ‘sadness’ in the semantic network may not be limited to 
other semantic concepts like cry or alone, but also perceptual representations like looking down 
(Meier & Robinson, 2006), or conjuring relatedly dark colours like blue or black (Nelson, 
McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004). 
To test the experiential account of emotional grounding in colour processing, Fetterman, 
Robinson, and Meier (2012) examined the ease with which participants could categorize emotion 
words depending on the colour the word was presented. Specifically, they examined the 
hypothesis that anger is grounded in the colour red. In their first experiment, they had 
participants categorize words as either fear, anger, or neutral meaning when presented in either 
gray or red colours, and found that red colour facilitated anger categorizations compared to gray, 
but did not facilitate fear categorizations compared to gray. In a second experiment, they 
extended these findings by testing sad and anger emotion words in the colours red and blue. 
They found significantly faster anger categorizations in the colour red than the colour blue, while 
categorizing sad emotions in blue did produce this effect. When examining colour 
categorizations (i.e., rage is ‘blue’), they found no evidence that emotion meaning modulated 
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colour categorization speed. They concluded that the asymmetry between tasks provides 
unambiguous support for the grounding of anger emotion in red colour perception, and thus 
support for their theory that metaphors reflect the grounding of emotion in perceptual processes.  
Contrary to the findings of Fetterman et al. (2012), Sutton and Altarriba (2008) found that 
colour categorization of emotion words did reveal congruency effects in terms of faster reaction 
times (RTs) with congruent combinations compared to incongruent combinations. Namely, the 
words ‘angry’ or ‘rage’ presented in red, ‘sad’ or ‘depression’ presented in blue, ‘scared’ or 
‘coward’ presented in yellow, and ‘greed’ or ‘envy’ presented in green showed faster RTs than 
incongruent combinations. Thus, they argued that the representation of emotion words in 
memory can be studied in the same manner as other colour associates like ‘fire’ in red font 
(Klein, 1964). Under this framework, colour-related emotion words in the semantic network 
activate automatic spreading activation from the word’s meaning to the colour.  
The results of Sutton and Altarriba (2008) extend the processing of emotion words to a 
larger body of literature with colour associates (see also Anton et al. 2014; Klein, 1964), 
whereby spreading activation from a word’s meaning shows a congruency effect with colour-
naming. Fetterman et al. (2012) argued that this direction of effect of words acting on colour 
categorization was absent in their own results, and that colour processing is the dominant process 
that acts on emotion-word meaning, whereas Sutton & Altarriba found evidence for emotion 
word meaning generating congruency effects during colour categorization. Unfortunately, 
Fetterman et al. (2012) used 37.5% less trials with colour categorization than word 
categorization, and Sutton & Altarriba (2008) did not include a word categorization task. Thus, 
claims about asymmetries in congruency effects remains on uncertain grounds.  
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Differences between these two studies make drawing strong conclusions about the 
relationship between colour and emotion words even more difficult. First, while Fetterman et al. 
(2012) examined individual colour and emotion combinations, Sutton and Altarriba (2008) 
analyzed congruency effects as an average across colours and emotion types, which makes it 
difficult to determine if some conditions were driving their effects (e.g., anger-red associations). 
Second, the difference in the number of colours (four with Sutton & Altarriba, 2008; two with 
Fetterman et al. 2012) and the number of words per emotion category (two with Sutton & 
Altarriba, 2008; ten in Expt 1, and six in Expt 2 with Fetterman et al. 2012) suggest potential 
sources for these contradictory results. For instance, colour-emotion associations found in the 
colour categorization task may be peculiar to the limited word set employed by Sutton and 
Altarriba (2008) and not generalize to a larger set of words.  
Overall, there is evidence that supports both emotion words acting on colour-
categorization, and colour acting on emotion categorization of words, although the mechanism of 
these effects remains unclear. Given the incompatibility of these two accounts, we sought to 
address three key findings that have shown inconsistencies. First, we will examine whether 
reliable Stroop effects will occur with colour associated emotion words when employing a larger 
set of words for each category. Second, we will examine whether congruency effects in the word 
categorization task only occur for anger-meaning words, as Fetterman et al, (2012) found. Third, 
we will examine if congruency effects occur for both colour and word categorization tasks, or if 
an asymmetry exists, suggesting a dominance of colour or word processing with emotion words.  
2.1 Hypotheses 
We tested the association of emotion-related words and colours, evaluating the 
hypotheses that: (1) emotion-related words are grounded in colour simulation, reflected by a 
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colour congruency effect on semantic categorization, and (2) colour identification is influenced 
by the semantic processing of emotion words, reflected by a semantic congruency effect on 
colour categorization. Given the results of Fetterman et al. (2012), we hypothesized dominant 
congruency effects with semantic categorization. To the extent that a direct association occurs 
between emotion and colour (e.g., Sutton & Altarriba, 2008), we hypothesized smaller 
congruency effects on colour categorization. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Thirty-three undergraduates were recruited from the University of Saskatchewan 
psychology participant pool and given course credit for their participation. Participants had a 
mean age of 19.5 years (SD = 2.00, range of 18-26 years), normal or corrected-to-normal vision, 
and English as their first language. Participants were tested individually after giving informed 
consent. The experiment was approved by the University of Saskatchewan Research Ethics 
Board.  
2.2.2 Stimuli 
The stimuli included 48 words, half of which had a meaning related to sad emotion (sad 
meaning words), and the other half of which were related to the emotion of anger (‘mad’ 
meaning words; see Appendix A). Words were selected through a systematic search of synonyms 
for ‘sad’ and ‘anger,’ as well as their synonyms, and verified for clear meaning with fellow 
research assistants. Sad and mad word lists were matched for length, t(46) = .965, p = .339 and 
word frequency, t(46) = .982, p = .331 (Balota et al. 2007). Each word was presented once in the 
colour red (RGB = 255, 0, 0; HSB = 0°, 100, 100) and once in the colour blue (RGB = 0, 0, 255; 
HSB = 240°, 100, 100) in each task block.  
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2.2.3 Apparatus 
The experiment was programmed and run using E-Prime (www.pstnet.com) on a Lenovo 
6075-DPU computer with a 60Hz Compaq 7500 colour monitor. An Audio-Technica ATR1200 
microphone was used to activate the voice key in a PST serial response box. 
2.2.4 Design and Procedure 
On each trial, a white fixation-cross appeared in the center of a black screen until the 
participant pressed the spacebar. The fixation cross remained for 500 ms and was replaced by the 
stimulus on a black background until the participant vocally categorized either colour (‘red’ or 
‘blue) or semantic category (‘mad’ or sad’), triggering the microphone. The experimenter then 
coded the response as mad/sad meaning with semantic categorization, red/blue colour with 
colour categorization, or indicated a spoiled trial (e.g., smacking lips; vocalization failed to 
trigger the microphone). Ten randomly chosen practice trials drawn from the 96 test stimuli 
appeared prior to each task block, which led directly into test trials. The 96 test trials were 
chosen randomly, and task order (colour categorization; semantic categorization) was 
counterbalanced between participants. Half the stimuli were congruent (red-mad or blue-sad) and 
the remaining half was incongruent. After completing experimental tasks, participants rated each 
word (presented in white) on the strength of its emotion association using a five point scale (1 
being moderate and 5 being extreme, given that each word was chosen to have at least a 
moderate association to emotion). 
2.3 Results 
After removing spoiled trials, median RTs for correct trials and errors were analyzed by-
subjects (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2) and by-items. Medians were chosen as they are more protected 
from outliers. For each analysis, a 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) included Colour (red, 
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blue), Emotion (mad, sad), and Task (colour categorization, semantic categorization). Each 
factor was repeated by-subjects, whereas by-items, Emotion was between items (see Table 2.1 
for ANOVA results). Overall, the main effect of Task was consistent by-subjects and by-items, 
indicating faster RTs on colour categorization than semantic categorization. The interaction 
between Colour and Emotion was also consistent, supporting congruency effects on RTs. The 
effects shown on RTs were not mitigated by errors, as there were no results with errors in the 
opposite direction to support a speed accuracy trade-off. Finally, the three-way interaction on 
RTs, including Task, indicates that congruency effects were significantly different between tasks. 
That is, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the predicted congruency effects for semantic categorization, 
but not for colour categorization. 
  
Figure 2.1. Semantic emotion categorization RTs as a function of Emotion and Colour. Error 
rates are displayed above as a proportion out of 1 (with a 95% confidence interval of .022; 
asterisks for all figures represent significant differences by errors to the adjacent bar). For all 
figures, intervals 95% confidence intervals (CIs) represent Loftus and Masson’s (1994) 95% 
repeated measures CIs using the within-subjects error term (95% CI = 19.2 ms on RTs). 
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Table 2.1 
ANOVA Results for Experiment 1 by-subjects (s) and by-items (i) for Median RTs and Errors 
Experiment 1  Fs Fi (df1, df2)s (df1, df2)i MSEs MSEi ps pi 
Latency         
   Colour 1.84 4.20 (1, 32) (1, 46) 1473.73 1211.81 .185 *.046 
   Emotion 2.06 1.16 (1, 32) (1, 46) 2767.09 5190.77 .161 .287 
   Task 324.51 781.19 (1, 32) (1, 46) 324.51 6121.44 *< .001 *< .001 
   Colour x Emotion 7.66 16.01 (1, 32) (1, 46) 1376.97 1211.81 *.009 *< .001 
   Colour x Task 8.02 4.14 (1, 32) (1, 46) 1162.71 1269.13 *.008 *.048 
   Emotion x Task .09 .19 (1, 32) (1, 46) 3030.82 6121.44 .767 .668 
Colour x Emotion x Task 6.85 8.57 (1, 32) (1, 46) 1186.54 1269.13 *.013 *.005 
Errors         
   Colour .52 .41 (1, 32) (1, 46) .003 .002 .478 .526 
   Emotion 16.60 4.33 (1, 32) (1, 46) .003 .009 *< .001 *.043 
   Task 16.45 8.53 (1, 32) (1, 46) .006 .008 *< .001 *.005 
   Colour x Emotion 13.60 16.58 (1, 32) (1, 46) .003 .002 *.001 *< .001 
   Colour x Task .25 .14 (1, 32) (1, 46) .003 .002 .621 .715 
   Emotion x Task 3.89 1.53 (1, 32) (1, 46) .005 .008 .057 .222 
Colour x Emotion x Task .28 .32 (1, 32) (1, 46) .004 .002 .598 .573 
Note: MSE = mean square error; df = degrees of freedom; * = significant at p < .05.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Colour categorization RTs as a function of Colour and Emotion. Error rates are 
displayed above as a proportion out of 1 (95% CI = .019). RTs have a 95% CI of 8.3 ms.  
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incongruent RTs. Then, participants’ red and blue average congruency effects were summed and 
divided by two, producing an average colour categorization congruency effect of 1.55 ms. The 
colour categorization congruency effect of 1.55 ms was compared to 0 in a one-sample t-test, 
t(32) = .438, p = .664, where the Bayes factor in support of the null hypothesis was 6.746, and 
thus a posterior probability of .871, indicating positive evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e., no 
congruency effect). 
 In the semantic categorization task, the average congruency effect was calculated 
separately for mad and sad meaning words by subtracting congruent RTs from incongruent RTs. 
Mad and sad congruency effects were then summed and divided by two for each participant, 
yielding an average congruency effect for semantic categorization of 23.74 ms. The average 
congruency effect of 23.74 ms was then compared to 0 in a one-sample t-test, t(32) = 2.939, p = 
.006, where the Bayes factor in support of the alternative hypothesis was 5.625, and thus a 
posterior probability of .849, indicating positive evidence for the alternative hypothesis (i.e., 
congruency effect). 
Next, we compared mad and sad word lists on ratings of their emotional association (see 
Appendix A). Using a  scale of 1 – 5 (representing ‘moderate’ to ‘extreme’), mad words had a 
mean rating of 3.99, and sad words had a mean rating of 3.30. The mad word list had a larger 
mean rating than the sad word list (after controlling for inequality of variances, Levene’s test 
F(46) = 6.20, p = .016) when submitted an independent samples t-test, t(40.41) = 5.675, p < .001.  
To test if effects in the item-analysis of correct median RTs were due to these rating 
differences, we repeated the ANOVA with Colour, Emotion and Task, with Rating as a 
continuous variable. In this analysis, the effect of Rating and its interaction with other variables 
is tested on RTs to examine if differences between list ratings may have produced the effects. If 
 19 
Rating is a significant source of these effects, then adjustments on RTs to account for differences 
in list ratings will prevent this ANOVA from replicating the previous ANOVA without Rating. 
The main effect of Task was still significant, F(1,45) = 18.36, MSE = 6080.49, p < .001. In 
addition, the interaction between Colour and Emotion was still significant, F(1,45) = 8.90, MSE 
= 1238.56, p = .005. Finally, the three-way interaction was still significant, F(1,45) = 5.49, MSE 
= 1296.29, p = .024. The remaining main effects of Colour, Emotion, and Rating, and their two 
way interactions failed to reach significance, Fs(1,45) < 2.17, ps > .147. These results largely 
replicated the by-subjects and by-items analyses without Rating, with the exception of the 
significant interaction between Colour and Task in the by-subjects analysis, and the significant 
main effect of Colour and significant interaction between Colour and Task found in the by-items 
analysis. Thus, differences in congruency effects should not be attributed to differences in rating 
across word lists. 
Importantly, when Task Order was included as a between subjects variable with RTs, the 
main effect of Task Order and its interactions did not reach significance, Fs(1, 31) < .817, ps > 
.372. By errors, the only the Task x Emotion x Task Order interaction approached significance, 
F(1, 31) = 3.801, MSE = .004, p = .060. As the remaining main effect of Task Order and its 
interactions did not reach significance, Fs(1, 31) < 1.732, ps > .197, the interpretation of 
congruency effects should not be attributed to carry-over effects between tasks.  
2.4 Discussion 
 We investigated the direction of association between emotion and colour perception 
using both colour and semantic categorization tasks. Specifically, we investigated if the 
association between the colour blue and ‘sad’ emotion and the colour red and ‘anger’ emotion 
would be stronger during colour categorization or semantic categorization, revealing a dominant 
 20 
influence of word or colour processes in the domain of emotion.  
In the colour categorization task, RTs did not indicate congruency effects typically found 
with colour associates. In the present experiment, red categorizations were consistently faster 
than blue categorizations. Although this pattern produced the expected congruency effect on RT 
with mad words, it also produced the reverse pattern of congruency effects on RT for sad words, 
producing evidence for no congruency effects according to the Bayesian analysis. Thus, there are 
inconsistent congruency effects in colour categorization. The simplest interpretation is that red 
colour categorization was faster than blue colour categorization. In the semantic categorization 
task, the results indicated the expected association between red with anger emotion and blue with 
sad emotion. Both the RTs and error rates in the by-subject and by-item analyzes indicated faster 
RTs and fewer errors with congruent colour and emotion combinations, a pattern that persisted 
when controlling for emotion ratings (see Figure 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3. Relationship between colour and semantic emotion categorization. Evidence for 
congruency effects occurs from colour to semantic categorization for mad and sad words, while 
evidence for automatic semantic processing is inconsistent, occurring only for red-mad colour 
categorizations. 
 
Our results align more closely with the results of Fetterman et al. (2012) than of Sutton 
and Altarriba (2008), albeit with important distinctions. In semantic categorization, we 
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demonstrate new experimental support for an association between the colour blue and sad 
emotion, previously demonstrated only with self-report methods (Nelson et al. 2004). In 
addition, our results provide support for an association between the colour red and anger, which 
may have a strong physiological basis (e.g., becoming flush when becoming mad; Changizi et al. 
2006). According to Boyatzis and Varghese (1994), these colour-emotion schemas form early in 
childhood, and become progressively more complex into adulthood (Hemphill, 1996). For 
instance, Hemphill found in prior self-report studies that blue is also related to feelings of 
calmness and positive affect, indicating a multifaceted relationship between the colour blue and 
emotion that merits further study. In addition, one limitation of the current study, and similar 
studies is the categorical view of emotion, although much research supports emotion as a 
dimensional construct (Niemic & Warren, 2002). Thus, a more nuanced approach to the 
relationship between emotion and colour should be the next step for future research in this area.  
Although our results showed a congruency effect in colour categorization for mad 
emotion words, they did not support Sutton and Altarriba’s (2008) finding that colours and 
emotions have distinct congruencies in the colour categorization task. Our task employed two 
emotion types (mad and sad), whereas their study employed a larger set of four emotion types 
(anger, sadness, envy, and cowardice), which they averaged together when examining 
congruency effects. In particular, Sutton and Altarriba used words that were shown to generate 
colour words in a free association task (Nelson et al. 2004), supporting the conclusion that their 
effect was generated by the proximity with which specific emotion and colour words exist in the 
semantic network, supporting a direct association. Our own word lists were generated on the 
principle of deeply probing two emotion concepts (i.e., sad and mad emotion) within the 
semantic network, testing how general the association between colour and mad and sad emotion 
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words can be generalized to words. Certain words in our lists support the conclusion of Sutton 
and Altarriba (2008), where ‘angry’, an item they included, resulted in a Stroop effect of 130.5 
ms in our colour categorization task (see Appendix B). However, our Bayesian analyses show 
that the colour categorization congruency effect would have a posterior probability of only .129 
(i.e., 1 - .871). In this way, we suggest specific words in an emotion category (e.g., ‘angry’) may 
be directly related to colour in the semantic network, despite having a similar emotion 
association rating as words less related to colour (e.g., vile, Stroop effect 12 ms). Thus, an 
important distinction may be drawn that some mad or sad emotion words are colour-related, but 
word membership in a mad or sad category does not categorically show a direct association with 
colour.  
It remains, however, if this pattern of congruency effects is peculiar to the domain of 
emotion and colour processing. In a similar metaphorical relationship, the temperature meanings 
of hot and cold are also related to the colours red and blue, respectively (e.g., Ho,Van Doorn, 
Kawabe, Watanabe, and Spence, 2014). To examine if the dominant effects of colour processing 
on semantic categorization generalizes beyond the semantic domain of emotion, we tested this 
relationship with temperature in a similar manner to Experiment 1. 
Chapter 3: Temperature Stroop Experiments 
 Experiments 2 and 3 are in press with Visual Cognition. The manuscript has been adapted 
for this chapter to ensure consistency with the broader thesis.  
Lorentz, E., Ekstrand, C., Gould, L., & Borowsky, R. (in press). Red-hot! How colour and 
semantic temperature processing interact in a Stroop-like paradigm. Visual Cognition. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13506285.2016.1183742 
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Temperature and colour associations have largely been studied in rating the thermal 
properties of physical colours, or describing the colours evoked by different temperatures, 
leaving the mechanism of this association largely unexplored. For instance, projected and surface 
red colours are rated warmer than blue colours (Lewinski, 1938; Newhall; 1941). This ‘cold-
blue’ and ‘red-hot’ association develops gradually, solidifying around age 18 (Morgan, Goodson, 
& Jones, 1975). These associations also occur with real objects. Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum 
(1957) had participants rate five objects presented in six colours on a scale of warmth, and found 
red objects were consistently rated warmer than objects in all other colours. 
In the above experiments, the purpose may have been obvious to participants, where 
expectancy of an association may have influenced the results. To investigate an unbiased 
association, Ho et al. (2014) employed two experiments examining a correspondence between 
colour, physical temperature and temperature words. In the first experiment, participants 
categorized colour patches (red, blue) and thermal words (‘warm’, ‘cold’) via a two alternative, 
forced choice button-press task. Participants were faster when congruent red-warm and blue-cold 
were paired (i.e., same button for hot/red) than with incongruent pairings (i.e., same button for 
red/cold), indicating the colour and temperature correspondence. Their second experiment 
involved priming physical temperatures and temperature words with different colour patches, as 
well as priming colour patches with physical temperatures or temperature words. Participants 
were instructed to categorize either warm or cold physical temperature, the words ‘warm’ or 
‘cold’, or the colour patches red or blue in separate blocks using verbal responses (i.e., say 
‘red’/‘blue’, or ‘hot’/‘cold’). The critical finding in these priming tasks showed that colour 
primes produced faster responses with physical temperature categorization in congruent pairings 
than incongruent pairings (i.e., a congruency effect), although physical temperatures failed to 
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produce congruency effects with colour categorization. Additionally, words failed to produce 
congruency effects with colour categorization, and colours failed to produce congruency effects 
with word categorization. 
Two major methodological differences between Ho et al. (2014) and prior Stroop and 
semantic categorization tasks suggest how a relationship between colour and temperature words 
has yet to be found. First, while prior studies combined colour and words in the same stimulus 
(e.g., ‘fire’ in red font, ‘angry’ in blue font), Ho and colleagues separated primes from targets by 
2000 ms, a time determined by the apparatus used to generate thermal primes. As stimulus onset 
asynchronies are typically much shorter (e.g., 200 ms; Neely, 1991), when separated at all, a 
2000 ms SOA may allow prime processing to resolve before the target is presented. Secondly, 
Ho et al. employed a limited, two word set (‘warm’ and ‘cold’). Presented as targets, these words 
may have simply been read aloud instead of semantically categorized, greatly speeding 
responding. In contrast, similar studies like Anton, Gould, and Borowsky, (2014), Fetterman et 
al. (2012) and Sutton and Altarriba (2008) employed between 6 and 10 words, which serve to 
test a larger portion of the semantic network, minimize repetition, and preclude reading the target 
(e.g., ‘anger’, ‘fire’) as the response (i.e., ‘red,’ ‘blue’) . 
To test the semantic temperature and colour association similarly to Experiment 1, and 
prior Stroop and semantic categorization tasks, we employed a larger set of 24 hot and 24 cold 
meaning words. Each word was presented in both red and blue to create an equal number of 
congruent and incongruent pairs. Each pair was presented once in two blocks, one block for 
colour categorization (red, blue), and one for semantic categorization (hot, cold). A set of 24 
words in each list was used to generalize to items in the semantic network, in addition to 
generalizing to subjects.  
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3.1 Hypotheses 
Similar to Experiment 1, we tested the association of temperature-related words and 
colours, evaluating the hypotheses that: (1) temperature-related words are grounded in colour 
simulation, reflected by a colour congruency effect on semantic categorization, and (2) colour 
identification is influenced by the semantic processing of temperature words, reflected by a 
semantic congruency effect on colour categorization. In line with prior colour and semantic 
categorization studies, we removed target words from the response set, combined colours and 
words in the same target, and employed a larger set of words for each category to create optimal 
semantic categorization. To the extent that the temperature meaning is grounded in colour 
through red-hot and cold-blue associations, in line with the results of Experiment 1, we predicted 
a dominant influence of colour processing on semantic categorization, shown by colour 
congruency effects in semantic categorization. Given a natural association between hot-red and 
cold-blue, suggested by prior self-report studies (e.g., Morgan et al. 1975), we predicted an 
influence of temperature words on colour processing, producing Stroop effects in the colour 
categorization task.  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-four undergraduates (Mage = 20.2 years; SD = 1.55, range 18- 24) were recruited 
from the University of Saskatchewan psychology participant pool and given course credit for 
their participation. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and spoke English 
as their first language. The experiment was approved by the University of Saskatchewan 
Research Ethics Board.  
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3.2.2 Stimuli 
Twenty-four cold meaning words and 24 hot meaning words (see Appendix B) were 
selected through a systematic search of synonyms for ‘hot’ and ‘cold,’ as well as their synonyms, 
and verified for clear meaning with fellow research assistants. Lists were matched for length, 
t(46) = .763, p = .449, and word frequency, t(46) = .052, p = .958, (Balota et al. 2007). Each 
word was presented in size 18 Arial font once in the colour red and once in the colour blue in 
each task block.  
3.2.3 Apparatus 
The apparatus was identical to Experiment 1. 
3.2.4 Design and Procedure 
The design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1. 
3.3 Results 
After removing spoiled trials, median RTs for correct trials and errors were analyzed by-
subjects (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) and by-items. For each analysis, a 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) included Colour (red, blue), Temperature (hot, cold), and Task (colour 
categorization, semantic categorization). Each factor was repeated by-subjects, whereas by-
items, Temperature was between items (see Table 3.1 for ANOVA results). Overall, the main 
effect of Task was consistent across subjects and items, indicating larger RTs for semantic 
categorization than colour categorization. The main effect of Colour was not consistent between 
subjects and items. Consistent interactions between Colour and Temperature by subjects and 
items also support congruency effects, with faster RTs and less errors with congruent red-hot and 
cold-blue pairs than the remaining incongruent pairs. However, including Task in the three-way 
interaction indicates that congruency effects were significantly different between tasks. Although 
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congruency effects are shown with semantic temperature categorization (see Figure 3.1), these 
effects were not consistent across hot and cold meanings with colour categorization (see Figure 
3.2). 
 
Figure 3.1. Semantic temperature categorization RTs as a function of Colour and Temperature. 
Errors are displayed above as a proportion out of 1 (95% CI = .022). RTs have a 95% CI of 13.2 
ms. 
 
Table 3.1 
ANOVA Results for Experiment 2 by-subjects (s) and by-items (i) for Median RTs and Errors 
Experiment 2 Fs Fi (df1, df2)s (df1, df2)i MSEs MSEi ps pi 
Latency         
   Colour 5.71 10.62 (1, 23) (1, 46) 449.51 994.24 *.025 *.002 
   Temperature .21 < .01 (1, 23) (1, 46) 1084.00 1190.83 .653 .971 
   Task 186.04 1634.02 (1, 23) (1, 46) 10661.62 1266.13 *< .001 *< .001 
   Colour x Temperature 20.45 30.77 (1, 23) (1, 46) 807.85 994.24 *< .001 *< .001 
   Colour x Task 2.03 .14 (1, 23) (1, 46) 1186.39 1002.72 .168 .711 
   Temperature x Task 1.83 3.00 (1, 23) (1, 46) 966.50 1266.13 .190 .090 
Colour x Temperature x Task 10.78 10.33 (1, 23) (1, 46) 662.54 1002.72 *.003 *.002 
Errors         
   Colour .39 .21 (1, 23) (1, 46) .002 .003 .538 .652 
   Temperature .53 .41 (1, 23) (1, 46) .003 .004 .475 .524 
   Task 12.16 12.48 (1, 23) (1, 46) .003 .004 *.002 *.001 
   Colour x Temperature 6.07 5.27 (1, 23) (1, 46) .003 .003 *.022 *.026 
   Colour x Task 1.62 .54 (1, 23) (1, 46) .001 .004 .216 .465 
   Temperature x Task 2.17 1.33 (1, 23) (1, 46) .002 .004 .154 .255 
Colour x Temperature x Task 8.97 5.57 (1, 23) (1, 46) .003 .004 *.006 *.023 
Note: MSE = mean square error; df = degrees of freedom; * = significant at p < .05.  
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Figure 3.2. Colour categorization RTs as a function of Colour and Temperature. Errors are 
displayed above as a proportion out of 1 (95% CI = .0182). RT have a 95% CI of 9.0ms. 
 
We also conducted Bayesian analyses on the average congruency effect on RTs in each 
task, where prior odds for both the null and alternative hypotheses were set to one. In the colour 
categorization task, the average congruency effect of 6.35 ms was compared to 0 in a one-sample 
t-test, t(23) = 1.361, p = .187. The Bayes factor in support of the null hypothesis was 2.688, and 
thus a posterior probability of .729, indicating weak evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e., no 
congruency effect), or a posterior probability of .271 for the alternative hypothesis. In the 
semantic categorization task, the average congruency effect of 30.75 ms was compared to 0 in a 
one-sample t-test, t(23) = 4.894, p < .001, where the Bayes factor in support of the alternative 
hypothesis was 434.33, and thus a posterior probability of .998, indicating very strong evidence 
for the alternative hypothesis (i.e., congruency effects). 
When comparing hot and cold word lists on ratings of temperature association (see 
Appendix), hot words (M = 4.21) had significantly higher ratings than cold words (M = 3.44), 
t(46) = 4.77, p < .001. We follow-up this difference in our replication with Experiment 3. 
Importantly, when Task Order was included as a between subjects variable with RTs, the 
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main effect of Task was marginally significant, F(1, 22) = 3.25, MSE = 31078.82, p = .085, and 
the Task by Task Order interaction was significant, F(1, 22) = 6.93, MSE = 8476.69, p = .015. 
These results indicated faster RTs on the second task, especially for colour identification 
appearing second. As the remaining interactions were not significant for either RTs or errors, 
Fs(1, 26) < 1.92, ps > .17, the interpretation of congruency effects should not be attributed to 
carry-over effects between tasks.  
3.4 Discussion 
We tested the dominant mechanism of association between colour and temperature by 
employing both semantic and colour categorization tasks. Semantic categorization revealed 
significant and consistent congruency effects, with speeded responding and less errors for 
congruent pairings (i.e., red-hot and blue-cold) compared to incongruent pairings (i.e., red-cold 
and blue-hot). In addition, a congruency effect appeared for hot meaning words with colour 
categorization, but not cold meaning words on RTs, with no significant effects of errors. These 
results provide evidence of a dominant influence of colour processing over semantic 
categorization compared to the reverse direction (see Figure 3.3).  
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Figure 3.3. Relationship between colour and semantic temperature categorization. Evidence for 
congruency effects occurs from colour to semantic categorization for hot and cold words, while 
evidence for automatic semantic processing is inconsistent, occurring only for red-hot colour 
categorizations. 
 
Consistent with the metaphor that hot is red and cold is blue, these results more broadly 
support the theory of grounded cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 2008), as decisions about abstract 
temperature concepts were systematically influenced by related, but task-irrelevant colour cues. 
Although the use of metaphor may be used as a helpful analogy, our results point to the 
obligatory association of colour with temperature. Similar to Meier et al. 2004, the stimulus 
colour appears to automatically suggest its temperature association. These results are also 
consistent with the theory of metaphor representation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), whereby 
concept knowledge builds on physical feature representations.  
In the reverse direction, some evidence supports the influence of semantic processing on 
colour categorization, although a dissociation between red-hot and cold-blue conditions suggests 
this association is not based on metaphor. Rather, as Algom et al. (2004) indicates, a natural 
relationship may exist between hot meaning words and the colour red. One plausible explanation 
is that hot words show a direct association with naturally red objects, where hot associated words 
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like ‘lava,’ ‘magma,’ or ‘fever’ may also be colour-associates, similar to words like ‘lemon’ with 
yellow or ‘grass’ with green (Klein, 1964). Another origin of these direct associations may stem 
from physiological effects of temperature on the human body. Generating excess internal body 
heat leads to dilation of the blood vessels and a flush, red facial expression (Shearn, Bergman, 
Hill, Abel, & Hinds, 1990), which can also be associated with increased activity during emotions 
of anger and sexual arousal (Changizi, Zhang, & Shimojo, 2006).  
In supporting the dominance of colour processing over semantic processing in the domain 
of temperature, our results generalize the grounding of semantic concepts in perception, as 
suggested through primary metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). The dominance of perceptual 
encoding with abstract concepts like emotion and temperature bring strong support for the theory 
of grounded cognition, as our effects suggest an obligatory association between perception and 
concept knowledge.  
After completing the prior experiment, feedback from reviewers from Visual Cognition 
requested that we conduct an additional experiment, first to show a replication, and second to 
evaluate whether the congruency effect for semantic categorization was driven by facilitation, 
interference, or both. In addition, we took the opportunity to determine if colour associations 
were driving Stroop effect in colour categorization, and not differences in word list ratings 
between hot and cold word lists. In order to address these questions, we conducted a second 
experiment using a neutral baseline, which would assess the contribution of facilitation or 
interference in each task. Secondly, the use of a neutral colour green can address the mechanism 
of congruency effects in the colour categorization task, as green is neutral with respect to 
temperature associated words, but incongruent with respect to red or blue colour associated 
words. 
 32 
3.5 Hypotheses 
If hot words are also red colour associate words, then presenting words like ‘lava’ in red 
will be congruent, and ‘lava’ in any other colour, like green or blue, would be incongruent, 
suggesting only facilitation will be present comparing red-hot to red-green combinations, and no 
difference between hot-green and hot-blue combinations. If temperature association is driving 
congruency effects with hot words in colour categorization, then presenting words like ‘lava’ in 
green should be neutral, and ‘lava’ in blue should be incongruent, generating both facilitation 
and interference. Thus, Experiment 2 was replicated with the addition of a neutral colour (i.e., 
green) to allow for the assessment of facilitation and inhibition relative to this neutral baseline 
for each task.  
3.6 Method 
 Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2 with the inclusion of green colour (RGB = 0, 
0, 255; HSB = 120°, 100, 100). Colour categorization included the response ‘green.’ Twenty-
four additional participants (ages 18-34, M = 21.5, SD = 4.0) were recruited who spoke English 
as their first language and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Experiment 3 also included 
a test of colour vision using Ishihara plates (colourvisiontesting.com/ishihara.htm); none of the 
participants had colour vision deficits.  
3.7 Results 
After removing spoiled trials, median RTs for correct trials and errors were analyzed by-
subjects and by-items (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5). For each analysis, a 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA included 
Colour (red, green, blue), Temperature (hot, cold), and Task (colour categorization, semantic 
categorization). Each factor was repeated by-subjects, whereas by-items, Temperature was 
between items (see Table 3.2 for ANOVA results). Again, the main effect of Task was consistent 
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across subjects and items, which indicated faster responding with colour categorization than 
semantic categorization. Consistent interactions between Colour and Temperature, both by 
subjects and by items, supported congruency effects. However, the three-way interaction 
indicated congruency effects were significantly different between task, with a pattern consistent 
with congruency effects for semantic categorization (see Figure 3.4), but less so for colour 
categorization (see Figure 3.5). 
 
Figure 3.4. Semantic temperature categorization RTs as a function of Colour and Temperature. 
Errors are displayed above as a proportion out of 1 (95% CI = .031). RTs have a 95% CI of 16.8 
ms. 
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Table 3.2 
ANOVA Results for Experiment 3 by-subjects (s) and by-items (i) for Median RTs and Errors 
Experiment 3 Fs Fi (df1, df2)s (df1, df2)i MSEs MSEi ps pi 
Latency         
   Colour 1.73 2.85 2, 46 2, 92 1297.60 1135.17 .190 .063 
   Temperature 5.32 .55 1, 23 1, 46 2082.51 2627.30 *.030 .465 
   Task 194.65 849.23 1, 23 1, 46 11737.75 2845.76 *< .001 *< .001 
   Colour x Temperature 11.58 7.79 2, 46 2, 92 918.10 1135.17 *< .001 *.001 
   Colour x Task .52 1.77 2, 46 2, 92 887.31 992.22 .596 .177 
   Temperature x Task 2.88 .14 1, 23 1, 46 1398.22 2845.76 .103 .711 
Colour x Temperature x Task 2.39 4.74 2, 46 2, 92 1362.36 992.22 .103 *.011 
Errors         
   Colour .04 .02 2, 46 2, 92 .002 .002 .962 .977 
   Temperature .59 1.07 1, 23 1, 46 .007 .004 .450 .305 
   Task 24.52 60.41 1, 23 1, 46 .009 .004 *< .001 *< .001 
   Colour x Temperature 14.04 15.66 2, 46 2, 92 .003 .002 *< .001 *< .001 
   Colour x Task 3.34 4.28 2, 46 2, 92 .003 .002 *.044 *.017 
   Temperature x Task 1.84 3.36 1, 23 1, 92 .007 .004 .189 .073 
Colour x Temperature x Task 3.28 3.78 2, 46 2, 92 .002 .002 *.047 *.026 
Note: MSE = mean square error; df = degrees of freedom; * = significant at a p < .05 level. 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Colour categorization RTs as a function of Colour and Temperature. Errors are 
displayed above as a proportion out of 1 (95% CI = .0128). RT have a 95% CI of 11.0 ms. 
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probability of .747, indicating weak evidence for the congruency effects. In the word 
categorization task, the average congruency effect of 32.31 ms was compared to 0 in a one-
sample t-test, t(23) = 3.305, p = .003, where the Bayes factor in support of the alternative 
hypothesis was 13.15, and thus a posterior probability of .929, indicating strong evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis (i.e., congruency effects). 
We also tested facilitation and interference separately relative to neutral in both tasks 
with RTs. To test facilitation in Semantic Categorization (see Figure 3.4), a 2 Temperature (hot, 
cold) x 2 Congruency (congruent; neutral) ANOVA revealed the effect of Congruency (Mcongruent 
= 718.65, Mneutral = 732.03, difference = 13.4 ms) was significant, F(1, 23) = 4.388, p = .047. For 
interference, the 2 Temperature (hot, cold) x 2 Congruency (neutral; incongruent) ANOVA 
showed the effect of Congruency (Mneutral= 732.03, Mincongruent = 750.96, difference = -18.9 ms ) 
was significant, F(1, 23) = 6.383, p = .019. The Temperature x Congruency interactions were not 
significant, F’s(1, 23) < .402, p’s > .532. With Colour Categorization, the 2 Temperature (hot, 
cold) x 2 Congruency (congruent; neutral) ANOVA revealed no main effect of congruency, F(1, 
23) = 1.105, p = .304, although the interaction was significant, F(1, 23) = 4.514, p = .045, 
suggesting the facilitation effect was different for hot and cold words (see Figure 3.5). Finally, 
the 2 Temperature (hot, cold) x 2 Congruency (incongruent; neutral) ANOVA revealed no main 
effect of Congruency, F(1, 23) = 1.105, p = .304, nor an interaction, F(1, 23) = .244, p = .626, 
indicating no effect of interference.  
When comparing hot and cold word lists on ratings of temperature association, hot words 
(M = 4.14) had significantly higher ratings than cold words (M = 3.78), t(46) = 2.61, p = .012. 
To examine whether differences in item ratings could account for our ANOVA results, we re-ran 
the three-way ANOVA by-items after eliminating items with a rating lower than 3.5 (removing 
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eight items in the cold list, one item in the hot list (see Appendix B). The lists were no longer 
significantly different by rating (Mcold = 4.12, Mhot = 4.18; t(37) = -.573, p = .57). Again, the 
main effect of Task (F(1, 37) = 840, p < .001), Colour by Temperature interaction (F(2, 74) = 
6.63, p = .002), and three-way interaction (F(2, 74) = 4.00, p = .023) remained significant. These 
results suggest differences between item ratings cannot account for this pattern of effects.  
When Task Order was included as a between subjects variable with RTs, the main effect 
of Task, F(1, 22) = 3.45, MSE = 21715.41, p = .077, and the 4-way interaction, F(2, 44) = 2.48, 
MSE = 1280.24, p = .096, approached significance, and the remaining interactions were not 
significant for RTs or errors, Fs(2, 44) < 2.54, ps > .124. As no effects reached significance with 
Task Order, the pattern of congruency effects should not be attributed to order effects.  
3.8 Discussion 
 Experiment 3 replicated the congruency effects shown in Experiment 2, where the 
semantic categorization task showed speeded responding with congruent pairings (i.e., red-hot 
and blue-cold) compared to incongruent pairings (i.e., red-cold and blue-hot). Relative to neutral 
baseline, significant facilitation was revealed with congruent pairings, and significant 
interference was revealed with incongruent pairings. With colour categorization, congruency 
effects were also shown for combinations of red and hot meaning words, but not blue-cold 
combinations, also replicating Experiment 2. Furthermore, evidence for facilitation was found 
with red-hot combinations relative to green-hot and blue-hot, but the effect of interference was 
not found (see Figure 3.6).  
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Figure 3.6. Relationship between colour and semantic temperature categorization. Evidence for 
facilitation (arrow ends) and interference (dotted ends) occurred from colour to semantic 
categorization for hot and cold words, while evidence for facilitation from semantics occurs only 
for red-hot colour categorizations. 
 
Given the dissociation between cold-blue congruency effects between colour and 
semantic categorization tasks, two mechanisms likely support the association between colour and 
semantic temperature. The association between cold and blue found in semantic categorization 
supports an abstract association, as this effect was not found with colour categorization, and 
suggests the grounding of cold meaning in the colour blue. As the red-hot association occurred 
with colour categorization, this association appears to be driven by direct colour-association of 
hot words with the colour red. That is, a natural relationship likely exists between hot meaning 
words and red colour (e.g., ‘lava,’ ‘magma’), conceptually similar to the semantic Stroop effect 
(whereby ‘blood’ is a colour-associate for red; e.g., Lorentz et al. 2016). With the red-hot 
association also found with semantic categorization, these results also support the grounding of 
hot meaning in the colour red.  
Overall, our results suggest a robust effect in the direction of colour processing affecting 
semantic processing, and a less consistent effect in the other direction. These results were 
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consistent across Experiments 1, 2, and 3, in semantic temperature and emotion domains. This 
asymmetry supports the grounding of temperature-associated and emotion-associated words, 
whereby concepts described through metaphors may be represented through simulating 
perceptual processes like colour, a mechanism suggested by the experiential account of language 
comprehension (e.g., Zwaan, 2004) and grounded cognition (Barsalou, 2008).  
However, abstract semantic domains do not only map onto colour processing. To 
describe the relationship of concept knowledge and perception beyond colour, we chose to 
investigate how metaphor may ground visual aspects of temporal processing. Linguists have 
discussed the importance of metaphors related to time, including ‘time as space’, ‘time as size’, 
and ‘time as motion’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Such primary metaphors have been show to 
span across cultures and languages (Ahrens & Huang, 2002). While a number of studies have 
explored physical correspondences between the domain of time, space, and motion, there is a 
dearth of literature examining metaphors of time relating semantic representations and visual 
aspects of duration. The aim of the following study, then, is to generalize and explore the 
dominance of either perceptual processing or semantic processing to the domain of time. 
Chapter 4: Time Stroop Experiment 
This chapter is based on the following manuscript under revision, and has been adapted 
to be consistent with the overall thesis.  
Lorentz, E., Gould., L., Ekstrand, C., & Borowsky, R. (2016). A Matter of Time: Time associate 
words show congruency with time perception in a Stroop-like paradigm. Under review at Acta 
Psychologica. 
Whether judging a safe interval to cross the street or recalling how long an event lasted as 
an eyewitness, the passage of time and its perception has regular impact on how we navigate our 
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world and make decisions regarding duration. The perception of time, however, does not rely on 
a single sense organ, nor does it rely on an external stimulus like vision or audition. Rather, the 
passage of time relies on an integration of internal and external cues, including planning and 
executing motor sequences, viewing the progression of visual stimuli, and the unfolding of 
mental operations (Fraisse, 1984; see Grondin, 2010, for a review). According to a theory of 
magnitude (ATOM), time duration may share representation with size and numerosity as a 
broader construct of magnitude (Walsh, 2003). We aimed to test whether semantic representation 
also recruits magnitude in the semantic domain of time using a Stroop-like task.  
 The representation of size and numerosity have previously been integrated in ATOM, 
where congruency effects in judgments of spatial size and numerosity indicate their shared 
representation in the common format of magnitude (Walsh, 2003). Recently, ATOM has been 
extended to accommodate properties of luminance (Kadosh, Kadosh, & Henik, 2008) and 
duration (Hayashi, Kanai, Tanabe, & Sadato, 2015; Vicario, 2011), bringing support for shared 
representations of magnitude across space, time, and quantity (see Bueti & Walsh, 2009 for a 
review). For instance, Vicario (2011) has shown that digit primes can bias estimating the 
midpoint of a duration (i.e., time bisection) for suprasecond intervals, whereby low digits 
decrease the bisection point, and larger digits increase the bisection point. Xuan, Zhang, He, and 
Chen (2007) also showed that observers judged larger magnitudes to last longer with the 
increased number of dots, size of open squares, luminance of squares, and larger numeric digits 
using a Stroop-like paradigm.  
Similarly, Dormal, Seron, and Pesenti (2006) found evidence for numerosity interference 
in a duration discrimination task, whereby participants indicated if a target duration was smaller 
or larger than a standard duration. The number of dots displayed for the target duration produced 
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both interference and facilitation in duration judgements relative to a neutral number of dots, 
particularly when discriminating smaller differences from the standard durations compared to 
larger differences. In the reverse task, where participants judged differences in the number of 
dots from a standard, duration differences did not produce congruency effects with numerosity 
discriminations. With the possibility of asymmetries between these modalities, these effects 
support a common mechanism in representing magnitudes between modalities. Indeed, common 
neural mechanisms have also been implicated across time and numerosity, particularly in the 
parietal cortex (Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan & Dehaene, 2004; Pouthas et al. 2005). 
 The study of time has also been investigated with semantic representation in relation to 
metaphor. For instance, spatial attention and time estimation show an association depending on 
the spatial metaphors a language employs. Casasanto and colleagues (2004) compared different 
language speakers who used either a dominant linear metaphor in their native language (e.g., 
long time; English and Indonesian) to speakers using a dominant quantity metaphor (e.g., much 
time; Greek and Spanish) in their native language on a time estimation task, using both growing 
lines (linear) and filling containers (quantity) as stimuli. Responses to these non-linguistic 
stimuli varied depending on the speaker’s native language, whereby growing lines only 
modulated time estimations for speakers using linear metaphors and filling containers only 
modulated time estimations for speakers using quantity metaphors. These results suggest native 
language can influence the spatial representations we use with time in memory and cognition. 
 Semantic concepts of time have also been studied more directly using semantic 
categorizations. When categorizing word tense as either past or future, a bias in spatial attention 
was revealed, whereby participants were faster to categorize past tense words presented to the 
left than the right, and the future tense showed the reverse relationship (Torralbo, Santiago, & 
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Lupianez, 2006). A similar relationship was also shown linking the past to the back and future to 
the front of space, indicating these spatial-temporal biases are malleable to orienting in the 
participant’s perspective. Such categorizing tasks provide a method to investigate common 
representation between modalities, and reveal the association between semantic processing and 
perceptual processes.  
Time perception is a rapid process that shows common mechanisms with motor 
production and regulating action generation (Keele, Pokorny, Corcos, & Ivry, 1985; Rao, Mayer, 
& Harrington, 2001) and it also moderates the integration of sensory information, suggesting that 
it is automatic (Poppel, 1997). As time-perception operates on a low level, it is a potential 
candidate in grounding high level semantic processing of time associated words, in keeping with 
the experiential account of language comprehension. According to Ahrens & Huang, (2002), the 
words we use to describe time involve metaphors around amount (e.g., a lot of time), motion 
(e.g., time is passing by), and velocity (e.g., time is slowly dragging on; see also Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999). By using words with these metaphorical association to time, we asked if 
duration and semantic time-associated words would interact in a similar way to temperature and 
colour.  
We employed a Stroop-like task in which time associated words (e.g., quick, infinite), 
were presented for both short (200 ms) and longer (367 ms) durations. Short and long duration-
associated words were paired with 200 ms and 367 ms durations to create congruent and 
incongruent stimuli for duration and semantic categorization tasks.  
4.1 Hypotheses 
Given support for common magnitude representations ATOM (e.g., Walsh, 2003), we 
hypothesized an association of time perception and semantic meaning through common 
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magnitude representations. Given the literature supporting magnitude cues like numerosity, 
luminance, or spatial cues impacting time estimates (e.g., Xuan et al. 2007), we hypothesized 
that congruency effects would be dominant in the duration categorization task over the semantic 
categorization task. However, to the extent that abstract concepts like time words share 
processing with basic perception (e.g., Barsalou, 2008), congruency effects were hypothesized in 
the semantic categorization task. Notably, research in time perception has dominantly relied on 
error analyses (see Grondin, 2008). Our analyses will thus focus on both RTs and errors for 
better comparison to the present experiments and the past literature. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-eight undergraduates (M = 19.75 years; SD = 2.63, range 17-28) were recruited 
from the University of Saskatchewan psychology participant pool and given course credit for 
their participation. All participants had normal or corrected-to normal vision, and spoke English 
as their first language. The experiment was approved by the University of Saskatchewan 
Research Ethics Board. 
4.2.2 Stimuli 
Twenty-four short meaning words and 24 long meaning words (see Appendix C) were 
selected through a systematic search of synonyms for ‘brief,’ ‘instant,’ ‘forever,’ and ‘eternal’ 
based on their metaphorical associations with time (i.e., spatial and magnitude associations). 
Lists were matched for length, t(46) = .965, p = .339 and word frequency, t(46) = .982, p = .331 
using eLexicon (Balota, Yap, Cortese, Hutchison, Kessler, Loftus et al. 2007). Each word, shown 
in size 18 Arial font and white colour, was presented once for 200 ms and once for 367 ms for 96 
total stimuli in a task block.  
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4.2.3 Apparatus. The apparatus was identical to Experiment 1. 
4.2.4 Design and Procedure 
The experiment design and procedures were the same as the previous experiments with 
the following exceptions. To minimize the potential for expectations to affect time perception, 
the fixation-cross remained on the screen for a randomly selected interval (350 ms, 400 ms, or 
450 ms) before it was replaced by the stimulus on a black background. Participants also used 
button press (e.g., press left for 200 ms duration, or right for 367 ms duration) instead of vocal 
response, comparable to prior research (e.g., Dormal et al. 2006; Xuan et al. 2007), with left and 
right buttons to make duration categorizations. Because of the difficulty of the task with time 
categorization, participants were also presented with feedback after each trial, including 
‘correct,’ in blue font and ‘incorrect,’ in yellow font, which remained until the participant 
pressed both buttons to initiate the next trial. Pressing both buttons reduced the effect of prior 
trial responses on the current trials. Assignment of buttons was counterbalanced across 
participants, and short meaning and brief duration responses did not switch buttons between 
blocks. 
4.3 Results 
Errors and correct median RTs were analyzed by subjects using a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA, with Duration (200 ms, 367 ms), Meaning (short, long), and Task (duration 
categorization, semantic categorization) as repeated measures factors (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
By-items, errors and correct median RTs were also analyzed with Meaning as a between-items 
factor (see Table 4.1 for ANOVA results). Overall, the main effect of Duration indicated faster 
responding with 200 ms duration trials than 367 ms duration trials, and the main effect of 
Meaning indicated faster responding with short meaning words than long meaning words. The 
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Duration by Meaning interaction, consistent across both RTs and errors, by subjects and by 
items, supports congruency effects. However, this pattern appears more consistent for duration 
categorization (see Figure 4.2) than semantic categorization (see Figure 4.1), supported by a 
three-way interaction on RTs by subjects. Additionally, the interaction between Duration and 
Task indicated that longer durations produced larger RTs, but particularly for Duration 
categorization. 
 
Figure 4.1. Semantic time categorization RTs as a function of Duration and Time Meaning. 
Errors are displayed above as a proportion out of 1 (95% CI = .021). RT have a CI of 29.0 ms.  
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Table 4.1 
ANOVA Results for Experiment 4 by-subjects (s) and by-items (i) for Median RTs and Errors 
Experiment 4  Fs Fi (df1, df2)s (df1, df2)i MSEs MSEi ps pi 
Latency         
   Duration 14.01 69.16 (1, 27) (1, 46) 4669.74 1386.14 *.001 *< .001 
   Meaning 4.39 4.70 (1, 27) (1, 46) 5979.71 6926.44 *.046 *.035 
   Task .23 .02 (1, 27) (1, 46) 43294.61 7831.65 .634 .894 
   Duration x Meaning 4.73 6.93 (1, 27) (1, 46) 2802.85 13886.14 *.038 *.012 
   Duration x Task 13.06 10.90 (1, 27) (1, 46) 4432.54 1727.55 *.001 *.002 
   Meaning x Task 3.14 3.05 (1, 27) (1, 46) 8268.89 7831.65 .088 .087 
Duration x Meaning x Task 6.36 .91 (1, 27) (1, 46) 2240.55 1727.55 *.018 .345 
Errors         
   Duration 19.23 26.52 (1, 27) (1, 46) .007 .005 *< .001 *< .001 
   Meaning .03 .01 (1, 27) (1, 46) .004 .009 .863 .912 
   Task 11.96 13.78 (1, 27) (1, 46) .002 .011 *.002 *.001 
   Duration x Meaning 22.80 14.34 (1, 27) (1, 46) .003 .005 *< .001 *< .001 
   Duration x Task 27.38 23.58 (1, 27) (1, 46) .006 .002 *< .001 *< .001 
   Meaning x Task .70 .28 (1, 27) (1, 46) .005 .011 .409 .599 
Duration x Meaning x Task .60 .34 (1, 27) (1, 46) .004 .006 .445 .563 
Note: MSE = mean square error; df = degrees of freedom; * = significant at p < .05.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Duration categorization RTs as a function of Duration and Time Meaning. Errors are 
displayed above as a proportion out of 1 (95% CI = .034). RTs have a 95 % CI of 22.3 ms. 
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a posterior probability of .894, indicating positive to strong evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis (a congruency effect), or a posterior probability of .106 for the null hypothesis. The 
semantic categorization congruency effect of .031 was compared to 0 in a one-sample t-test, 
t(27) = 3.55, p < .001, with a Bayes factor for the alternative hypothesis of 21.90, a posterior 
probability of .956, indicating strong evidence for the alternative hypothesis, or a congruency 
effect. 
Bayesian analyses also evaluated the average congruency effect on RTs for each task. 
The average duration categorization congruency effect of 31.35ms was compared to 0 in a one-
sample t-test, t(27) = 4.15, p < .001, with a Bayes factor for the null hypothesis of 92.71, a 
posterior probability of .989, indicating strong to very strong evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis (a congruency effect), or a posterior probability of .011 for the null hypothesis. The 
semantic categorization congruency effect of -.56ms was compared to 0 in a one-sample t-test, 
t(27) = -.051, p = .96, with a Bayes factor for the null hypothesis of 6.846, a posterior probability 
of .873, indicating positive evidence for the null hypothesis, or no congruency effect. 
We compared short and long word lists on ratings of the strength of their temporal 
association (see Appendix C). Short words had mean rating of 3.96, and long words had a mean 
rating of 3.86, although these lists did not differ significantly t(46) = .805, p = .425. 
 Importantly, when Task Order was included as a between subjects variable, only a Task 
by Task Order interaction was marginally significant with RTs, F(1, 26) = 3.60, MSE = 
39492.16, p = .069. As the remaining interactions with Task Order were not significant for either 
RTs or errors, Fs(1, 26) < 1.65, ps > .210, congruency effects should not be attributed to carry-
over effects between tasks.  
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4.4 Discussion 
With duration categorization, both errors and RTs strongly supported a congruency 
effect, such that word meaning systematically affected duration categorization. With short 
durations, short meaning words yielded faster RTs and fewer errors than long meaning words, 
and with long durations, long meaning words had shorter RTs and smaller error rates than short 
meaning words. Thus, this pattern of results reflects the typical Stroop effect, but in the domain 
of time. As RTs directly mirrored the pattern of errors with duration categorization, they 
reinforce the interpretation of consistent congruency effects, whereby semantic processing 
automatically and systematically affects temporal decisions.  
 The effect of time duration on semantic categorization also supports the interpretation of 
congruency effects at the level of errors. Within each duration, a congruency effect emerged 
between word types, and within each word type, congruency effects emerged between durations. 
The evidence with RTs was mixed, however. The main effect of word type emerged consistently 
at short and long durations, such that short meaning words were categorized faster than long 
meaning words. It may be the case that long meaning words were generally more abstract that 
short meaning words. While this possibility could be followed up with additional research (e.g., 
ratings on concreteness or tangibility), this potential difference should not bias congruency 
effects to one task over another. Rather, differences between word lists would be expected to 
generate effects at the level of a main effect, and not an interaction between word meaning and 
duration. On average, there was no congruency effect found with semantic categorization on 
RTs, but there was on duration categorization. This direction of effects supports the dominant 
processing of semantic meaning in the domain of time (see Figure 4.3).  
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Figure 4.3. Relationship between duration and semantic time categorization. Evidence for both 
congruency effects occurs from semantic processing to duration categorization for both 200 ms 
and 367 ms intervals, while evidence for congruency effects occurs only with errors from 
temporal processing to semantic categorizations. 
 
A strong influence of semantic processing on duration categorization extends the 
automaticity account of reading into the modality of time perception, even when word meaning 
was not task relevant. These congruency effects in time perception indicate that time perception 
tasks are susceptible to word reading influence, whereby a natural relationship occurs between 
the meaning of words and the physical durations that were categorized, similar to naming in the 
typical Stroop task (Algom et al. 2004). The word, albeit irrelevant, activates related duration 
representations, and indicates a connection between semantic processing and duration 
monitoring, likely overlapping as magnitude representations considering ATOM (Pinel et al. 
2004; Walsh, 2003). As monitoring of the duration of events is constantly ongoing, time 
perception is considered both automatic and low-level (Näätänen, Syssoeva, & Takegata, 2004; 
Poppel, 1997). When made task relevant, our results corroborate others in that time perception 
becomes susceptible to irrelevant information like numerosity (e.g., Dormal et al. 2006; Vicario, 
2011), spatial information (Torralbo et al. 2006) and, in the present case, semantic word 
processing. While access to semantic meaning is considered a slower, more high-level process 
Semantic 
Time 
Categorization 
Duration 
Categorization 
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than perceptual processes (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006), words 
have been shown to be processed through to semantic meaning, even in the absence of awareness 
(Lorentz, Gould, Mickleborough, Ekstrand, Boyer, Cheesman & Borowsky, 2015). 
The observed congruency effects with semantic categorization suggest time perception 
processes interact bidirectionally with the semantic network, at least with errors. However, this 
interaction was not symmetric in the case of RTs. In the semantic categorization task, different 
durations did not produce consistent congruency effects. The robust effect on errors supports 
automatic, mandatory processing of temporal features with subsequent impact on semantic 
categorization, and further reflects the automatic monitoring of duration. This direction of effects 
supports the experiential account of language comprehension (Barsalou, 2008, Zwaan, 2004), 
whereby perceptual representations support representations of conceptual knowledge (see also 
Allport, 1985; Gibbs, 2005). It may be that metaphorical phrases like ‘gone in a flash’ to 
represent brief are not just useful in explaining the abstract notion of time, but are essential in 
supporting its semantic representation. 
Chapter 5: General Discussion 
The common use of metaphor in language indicates a relationship between abstract 
concepts and basic perceptual processes (Barsalou, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Zwaan, 
2004). However, the robust Stroop effect also demonstrates automaticity in accessing semantic 
meaning in performing perceptual tasks. Four experiments reported here describe the underlying 
mechanisms supporting the shared representation of perceptual processes and conceptual 
meaning. 
5.1 Summary of Major Findings 
Experiment 1 tested the dominant direction of influence in the ‘mad is red’ and ‘sad is 
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blue’ metaphor of emotion. In two tasks, participants categorized colour (red or blue) and 
semantic meaning (mad or sad), where the irrelevant cue (either colour, or word meaning) 
provided congruent or incongruent trials. Consistent congruency effects on RTs emerged in 
semantic categorization, but not colour categorization. By errors, this pattern was supported with 
semantic categorization, but was not consistent in colour categorization. Overall, a dominant 
influence of colour processing on semantic categorization is suggested, as more consistent 
congruency effects occurred with semantic categorization (see Figure 2.3). 
Experiments 2 and 3 tested the dominant direction of perceptual and conceptual 
influences with the ‘red is hot’ and ‘blue is cold’ metaphor of temperature. Experiment 2 
provided a conceptual replication of Experiment 1, and Experiment 3 employed neutral trials 
with the colour green, testing the role of facilitation and interference in each task while 
replicating Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, congruency effects were consistent in semantic 
categorization for both hot and cold meaning words across RTs and errors. With colour 
categorization, congruency effects were only obtained with hot words (see Figure 3.3). In 
Experiment 3, the same congruency effects occurred, and the effects of facilitation and 
interference were consistent across hot and cold words with semantic categorization. With colour 
categorization, a facilitation effect was found for hot words in the colour red compared to green, 
but congruency effects were not consistent across hot and cold words (see Figure 3.6).  
Experiment 4 tested the dominant direction of influence in temporal processing with 
words metaphorically associated with time, including ‘quick’ and ‘slow.’ In semantic 
categorization, congruency effects were only consistent by errors. In time categorization, 
however, congruency effects were consistent in short and long meaning words across RTs and 
errors, indicating the dominant processing of semantic representations influencing perceptual 
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judgments in the domain of time (see Figure 4.3). Overall, each experiment provides new 
information about the direction of interactions between physical and conceptual processing (see 
Figure 5.1). 
 
Figure 5.1. A model of visual attribute encoding, reading and semantic processing, perceptual 
categorization, and response output. This model reflects whole-word and visual attribute 
processing in parallel, with evidence from four experiments represented by black arrows 
connecting the semantic system and attribute categorization leading to response output. 
Dominant influences (dashed lines) and facilitation and interference (solid lines) are shown by 
line thickness, indicating asymmetries between visual attribute processing and semantic 
processing before final categorization responses. 
 
 In Figure 5.1, a combined model of reading and visual perception categorization, visual 
features including letter shape, colour, and temporal attributes are first encoded and feed forward 
into perception and recognition systems. In comparison to the dual-route model of reading (e.g., 
see Anton et al. 2014) this model focuses on the ventral route, whereby common words are 
recognized using the orthographic lexical system. For instance, the word ‘scald’ is recognized in 
the orthographic-lexical system and mapped onto conceptual knowledge in the semantic system 
(see also Coltheart, Rastle, Perry, Langdon, & Zeigler, 2001, reviewing the dual-route cascaded 
model). In parallel with word recognition, other visual attributes are encoded, perceptually 
processed, and recognized in long-term memory for categorization. In this model, words or 
visual attributes may be categorized in the absence of physical attributes or semantic 
information, respectively, as indicated by the three processing routes. However, the connections 
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between perceptual categorization (i.e., colour, temporal attributes) and the semantic system in 
our model reflect the automatic, obligatory influence of related, but task irrelevant information 
when present. Dominant processes, and asymmetries in processing are indicated by the line 
thickness of connections, indicating that connection strength varies by visual attribute and 
semantic domain.  
5.2 Evidence for Grounded Cognition 
 In the domain of colour perception, our results provide strong support for the theory of 
grounded cognition, namely, that semantic concepts are embodied in overlapping sensorimotor 
representations (Allport, 1985). Although colour was irrelevant to semantic categorization tasks, 
and manipulated independently, it automatically and systematically influenced the semantic 
decisions about temperature and emotion meaning in the form of congruency effects. In the 
domain of temperature, we also saw evidence for facilitation and interference compared to a 
neutral baseline. Our evidence suggests that the physicality of abstract concepts in colour is not 
just helpful in their conceptualization, but rather that these associations are obligatory. In this 
way, our results support the theory that concepts are built on physical metaphor (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999), and that language comprehension is to some extent embodied in modal 
processes (Zwaan, 2004).  
 Congruency effects with colour in the abstract domains of emotion and temperature also 
bring counterevidence to purely amodal theories of semantic representation. While Quillian’s 
(1968) hierarchical model of semantic memory is intuitively based on efficiency, with 
propositional organization, the evidence supports modal overlapping in representations, with 
similarity between simulated features mapping the relationship between concepts (e.g., Rips et 
al. 1973). However, our evidence indicates these attributes are not represented purely 
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symbolically. Rather, the metaphorical relationship (e.g., ‘feeling blue’) between concepts and 
perceptual properties like colour indicates grounding semantic meaning in sensorimotor 
representations (Barsalou, 2008). 
This grounded theory of cognition fits well with theories of brain evolution. For instance, 
the representation of abstract concepts builds onto pre-existing structures that are more stimulus-
oriented in their representations (MacLean, 1990). In the course of development, abstract 
representations are also thought to build upon sensorimotor representations (Piaget & Inhelder, 
1969). Indeed, Johnson’s (1996) theory of conflation suggests that abstract and concrete concepts 
in metaphors like ‘red-hot’ are first conflated as children learn them, and only distinguished in a 
later period of differentiation. Overall, this asymmetry between abstract and concrete 
representations supports how conceptual knowledge may have a perceptual basis.   
5.3 Evidence for Stroop Effects in Perceptual Tasks 
The Stroop effect occurs when differences between a word’s semantic meaning (e.g., 
‘banana’) and its physical attribute (in this case blue font colour) create delayed responding or 
increased errors with incongruent compared to congruent pairs (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004; 
Lorentz et al. 2015; MacLeod, 1991). Thus, the Stroop effects reported here for perceptual 
categorization reflect a learned relationship between the semantic referent of the carrying word 
and the target visual attribute, whether colour or duration. Thus, congruency effects in the 
perceptual task likely reflect more literal, concrete associations (e.g., ‘magma’ in red) as opposed 
to metaphorical associations (e.g., ‘grief’ is blue). When performing perceptual tasks with colour 
and temporal categorization, we found congruency effects particularly for hot words across red, 
blue, and green colours, within each duration for time words comparing short and long meaning 
words, and with some words in the ‘mad’ meaning list that replicate prior emotion-related Stroop 
 54 
effects (i.e., ‘anger’; replicating effects shown by Sutton & Altarriba, 2008). These Stroop effects 
dissociated from congruency effects in the semantic categorization tasks across experiments, 
suggesting the mechanism driving Stroop effects is not the same mechanism driving semantic 
categorization congruency effects. While Stroop effects appear to reflect direct associations 
between semantic meaning and physical attributes, Grady (1997) describes the relationship of 
primary metaphors where concepts recruit sensorimotor attributes in their representation. To 
further investigate these differences, a measure of colour association, in addition to our ratings of 
semantic association, may help to disentangle the mechanism of these congruency effects.  
As Stroop effects in our perceptual categorization tasks appear to be independent from 
congruency effects in semantic categorization, an alternative interpretation may posit an amodal 
mechanism driving Stroop effects, while a modal mechanism is driving congruency effects in the 
semantic categorization task. Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) bring evidence that both linguistic 
factors (amodal) are independent from modal processing when performing different 
categorization tasks. When participants performed semantic relatedness judgments for words, 
typical and atypical word order (e.g., ‘beer-foam’ versus foam-beer) predicted RTs and errors, in 
addition to modal factors like spatial congruency (e.g., ‘foam’ on top and ‘beer’ on bottom 
versus ‘foam’ on bottom and ‘beer’ on top). Interestingly, Louwerse and Jeuniaux (2010) found 
that linguistic factors were more predictive when participants responded to word pairs than to 
matched picture pairs, and spatial iconicity was more predictive with picture stimuli than 
linguistic factors. Our perceptual and semantic categorization tasks, revealing both visual 
attribute and semantic influences, fits well with their results in suggesting both task and stimulus 
attributes can be predictive of congruency effects driven by modal and semantic factors. Still, a 
future direction for the present experiments could identify both linguistic and modal measures to 
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capture their independent contributions to congruency effects.  
5.4 Boundary Conditions, Limitations, and Future Directions 
While a clear association, and asymmetry in influence, is present in our data for colour-
based metaphors, there are boundaries in their support for grounded cognition. First, the data 
may not establish a purely semantic locus where congruency effects occur. For instance, it is 
possible that colour cues activate responses like ‘hot’ or ‘mad,’ demonstrating a response conflict 
instead of activating competing long-term memory representations (Zhang, & Kornblum, 1998). 
One future direction to investigate this hypothesis might include a lexical-decision task. If 
participants are faster to verify a word is correctly spelt when presented in a congruent colour, 
this evidence would remove the possibility of overlapping responses and further isolate a 
semantic locus (e.g., Meier et al. 2004).  
 A second boundary condition for the hypothesis of grounded cognition involves the 
relative automaticity of perceptual processes. Both colour processing and temporal processing 
are considered relatively low-level, fast processes (e.g., Lorentz, et al. 2015; Pöppel, 1997), 
although the processing of time does not appear to produce interference effects to the same 
extent as colour or numerosity (Dormal et al. 2005). In this way, the processing of different 
perceptual modalities is not equally mandatory, at least not in a way systematically producing 
congruency effects. This may relate to the stage of processing that is affected by congruency 
effects. While colours may activate semantic or response representations by their association 
with semantic concepts, the same may not be true about temporal processing. In this way, the 
grounding of concepts does not appear to occur equally across all modalities of visual 
perception.  
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 The present experiments have strong ties to the prior research in their respective domains 
of literature. For instance, experiments in the domains of emotion (e.g., Fetterman et al. 2012; 
Sutton & Altarriba, 2008) and temperature (e.g., Ho et al. 2014) have included larger word lists 
and overt naming, which the present experiments reflect directly. Our experiment regarding 
temporal processing also directly ties to prior research (e.g., Dormal et al. 2006; Xuan et al. 
2007) by using button press and focusing on errors analysis. In reflecting the approaches in the 
prior literature, the present experiments have the advantage of comparing back to research in 
their respective domains. 
Even so, the methods between the domains of time, temperature and emotion do not 
perfectly overlap, presenting limitations in generalizing our results across domains. For instance, 
the emphasis on error analyses in time research (Grondin, 2008) is not reflected in traditional 
Stroop paradigms, where RTs are the primary unit of analysis (e.g., Besner, Stolz, & Boutilier, 
1997; Lorentz et al. 2016; MacLeod, 1991). Thus, congruency effects on errors, but not RTs, 
may be differently described in the emotion experiment as less robust, and more reliable in the 
time experiment. By analyzing both RTs and errors, as well as generalizing to both items and 
subjects, our design bridges these disparate literatures to come to common conclusions around 
the direction of influence more broadly. It would be prudent, though, to conduct follow-up 
experiments independently emphasizing RTs (at the cost of errors) and accuracy (at the cost of 
RTs) to see if both measures still reflect the same underlying mechanism (e.g., Meier et al. 
2004). Generally, errors and RTs reflect the same processing, especially at a response selection 
stage, although qualitative differences may emerge with perceptual processing mechanisms 
(Pashler, 1989). Similarly, vocal and button press responses also show largely the same patterns 
of results, although there are reported instances of response modality differences (see MacLeod, 
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1991, for a review). Indeed, the generated conflict when processing multiple sources of 
information shows similar areas of activation in the anterior cingulate cortex between response 
modalities (Barch, Braver, Akbudak, Conturo, Ollinger, & Snyder, 2001; Lorentz, 
Mickleborough, Mendez, Gould, Ekstrand, Ellchuk, & Borowsky, submitted).  
 Another area for future research involves the use of neutral baselines. Stimuli using 
temperature words showed facilitation and interference with semantic categorization, and 
facilitation with colour categorization. While this additional level of detail is useful, the initial 
investigations employed two meanings and two colours or durations for two main reasons. First, 
neutral conditions may dilute the congruency effect, reducing the overall power (Lorentz et al. 
2016). Secondly, the neutral condition creates inherent differences between tasks (i.e., 2 
responses in the semantic categorization task, 3 responses in the colour categorization task in 
Experiment 3, which should only be used when a comparison to equal responses is possible (i.e., 
Experiment 2). An important future direction may explore how congruency effects would 
manifest in relation to facilitation and interference with the remaining modalities (e.g., with 
emotion words in Experiment 1, currently being pursued). Finally, we note the present 
experiments used only two levels of visual attributes and two levels of semantic meaning, 
creating an equal proportion of congruent and incongruent stimuli. Although more levels may be 
possible (e.g., 4 with Sutton and Altarriba, 2008), this allows more ways to create incongruent 
than congruent stimuli, whereby multiple baselines must be used to separately estimate 
facilitation, interference, and contingency effects (i.e., differences in repetition between 
conditions; Lorentz et al. 2016). Thus, the present experiments maximized the effects with the 
simplest design. 
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Another limitation inherent to the perceptual and semantic categorization tasks involves 
potential differences in task difficulty. Although Task effects were not consistently found,  
colour categorizations were typically faster than semantic categorizations in Experiments 1, 2, 
and 3. Such differences caution the interpretation of asymmetries in congruency effects. One 
explanation is that a deeper level of processing may occur with semantic categorizations than 
perceptual categorizations (e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972). If this is the case, modal visual 
attributes appear to influence deeper cognitive tasks, whereas word meaning and linguistic 
factors may influence shallower processes (see also Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010). One approach 
to overcoming these differences is the process dissociation procedure (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994). 
Similar to the approach we took in reversing the tasks in each experiment, the process 
dissociation procedure involves independently manipulating either the perceptual or conceptual 
elements to estimate their contribution to congruency effects. For instance, Lindsay and Jacoby 
(1994) found that asymmetries in facilitation and interference were eliminated when degrading 
the colour quality of Stroop stimuli relative to non-letter control items. Moreover, colour 
contributions remained constant when they manipulated the proportion of congruent stimuli, 
despite the changing contribution of word reading processes. Thus, the process dissociation 
procedure would provide a complimentary next step in describing the mechanism of the 
association described in the present experiments, while using a second method to extend the 
present results.  
Another notable limitation in the present experiments includes the use of new word lists 
to represent different semantic domains. While the ratings and accuracy measures converge to 
indicate each word fit its category as one meaning or the other in the vast majority of cases, some 
were less clear (e.g., ‘numb’ for cold, or ‘sluggish’ for short meaning). It may be valuable to only 
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include highly rated (e.g., greater than 3.5 out of 5) in future studies. Even so, the use of ratings 
for association raises the question of what these ratings really capture. Words may possess 
attributes of saliency, intensity, or other related attributes of strength in the semantic network, 
suggesting ratings of association is just one of multiple important word qualities (Sutton & 
Altarriba, 2008), each related to semantic categorization. Another limitation of these lists 
involves their association with metaphor. Metaphors are often used in common phrases like ‘over 
my head’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), whereas words on their own may be examined more 
literally, lending themselves to congruency effects in the perceptual categorization task more 
than the semantic categorization task. For instance, consistent perceptual congruency effects in 
the time categorization task may reflect the literal association between words and durations, in 
addition to their metaphorical relationship. Although the words chosen reflect the ‘time is 
motion’ metaphor (e.g., quick, rapid, speedy; continual, enduring, slow), other words may reflect 
more literal associations (e.g., brief, instant; forever). Errors in the time experiment suggest a bi-
directional relationship of duration and semantic processing influences, indicating automatic 
processing of these cues regardless of the task. Thus, it would be beneficial to separate the 
influences of direct and metaphorical associations in subsequent experiments. An interesting 
future direction may employ phrases with metaphorical relationships to physical attributes, while 
continuing to have participants categorize their meaning. This would serve to isolate the 
metaphorical relationship from the direct associations found with some words.  
 Lastly, the use of mixed congruent and incongruent trials can produce differences on a 
trial-by trial basis that may be of interest in future experiments. For instance, participants in 
traditional Stroop tasks show slowed responding and increased accuracy following an error, 
known as the Rabbitt/Laming effect (Laming, 1979; Rabbitt, 1966), which similarly occurs 
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following a conflict trial, known as the Gratton effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). When 
presenting feedback, these effects may be enhanced (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996), suggesting our 
experiment on time may have emphasized accuracy more than the experiments without feedback. 
Thus, an important direction to pursue would include emphasizing either reaction time or 
accuracy to test whether each measure consistently reflects the same effect, and/or how speed 
accuracy tradeoffs may differ between modalities (e.g., Meier et al. 2004).  
5.5 Conclusion 
These four studies sought to describe the dominant direction of processing influence 
underlying shared perceptual and conceptual processing in the semantic network. Using both 
perceptual and semantic categorization tasks, evidence for processing influence was found in 
both directions, although marked asymmetries were found across domains. Perceptual 
categorizations show congruency effects with semantically related, but not task relevant words 
when a direct association exists between co-occurring domains. With semantic categorization, 
congruency effects occurred more consistently when more abstract associations (e.g., ‘anger’ is 
‘mad’; ‘frigid’ is ‘cold’) took place. Overall, these results support the notion of grounded 
cognition, providing a framework for relating sensorimotor attributes and experience with 
linguistic and semantic processing.   
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Appendix A 
Characteristics of Emotion Word Stimuli 
Word Emotion Log 
Frequency 
HAL 
Length 
Emotional 
Association 
Rating (1-5 
scale) 
Word 
Categorising 
Congruency (ms) 
Colour 
Categorising 
Congruency (ms) 
alone sad 10.84 5 3.27 39 39 
crying sad 8.836 6 3.18 16 -1 
depressed sad 8.341 9 4 -14.5 -10 
despair sad 8.263 7 3.7 40 30 
distress sad 7.617 8 3.18 147 -50 
empty sad 9.866 5 3.33 74 0 
gloom sad 8.053 5 2.94 24.5 5 
grief sad 8.27 5 3.61 52.5 -40 
helpless sad 7.885 8 3.39 21 1.5 
hopeless sad 7.588 8 3.42 22.5 2 
hurting sad 8.15 7 2.97 -49 -37 
isolated sad 8.862 8 3.42 51.5 -16 
lonely sad 8.491 6 3.18 50 -7.5 
miserable sad 8.08 9 3.82 -22.5 -33.5 
missed sad 10.205 6 2.76 123.5 34.5 
mourn sad 6.347 5 3.64 35 -3 
regret sad 8.515 6 3.24 0 -42 
rejected sad 9.086 8 3.24 -11 -44 
sorrow sad 7.321 6 3.36 55.5 5 
sorry sad 11.445 5 2.64 25 0.5 
tragic sad 7.932 6 3.7 51.5 -55 
unhappy sad 8.241 7 2.88 -27 -18.5 
weep sad 6.717 4 3.12 52 -62 
withdrawn sad 7.686 9 3.27 91 -75 
 M 8.44 6.58 3.30 35.3 -15.7 
angry mad 9.506 5 3.76 53 130.5 
despise mad 7.256 7 4.03 79 42.5 
detest mad 6.159 6 3.85 186.5 -32 
enraged mad 6.319 7 4.3 25.5 68.5 
frustrated mad 8.472 10 3.03 -4.5 -6.5 
fury mad 8.259 4 4.3 5.5 -8 
harsh mad 8.499 5 3.42 -49.5 28.5 
hate mad 10.695 4 4.33 -7.5 26 
hostile mad 8.444 7 4.09 49 -5 
irritated mad 7.131 9 3.18 -21.5 52.5 
livid mad 5.204 5 4.64 126.5 45 
loathing mad 6.877 8 4.3 -1 89.5 
malicious mad 7.416 9 4.39 -16 -2.5 
mean mad 11.93 4 3.18 114 0 
outraged mad 7.12 8 4.42 8.5 24.5 
rage mad 8.747 4 4.45 18 8 
resent mad 7.546 6 3.27 236 51 
scorn mad 6.891 5 3.73 21 31 
spite mad 8.67 5 3.48 -56.5 -23 
vicious mad 8.176 7 4.58 98 -13 
vile mad 7.91 4 4.24 25 12 
violent mad 9.416 7 4.42 41.5 15.5 
wicked mad 8.345 6 4.06 -72.5 54.5 
wrath mad 8.638 5 4.33 -18 30 
 M 8.07 6.13 3.99 35.0 25.8 
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Appendix B 
Characteristics of Temperature Word Stimuli 
Word Temperature Log 
Frequency 
HAL 
Length 
Temperature 
Strength Rating 
(1-5 scale) 
Word 
Categorizing 
Congruency (ms) 
Colour 
Categorizing 
Congruency (ms) 
    Exp 1     Exp 4 Exp1     Exp 4 Exp1     Exp 4 
arctic cold 7.452 6 4.71     4.46 24      -54 -1      -85 
blizzard cold 7.651 8 4.00     4.38 9.5      118 30.5      17.5 
breeze cold 7.659 6 2.42     3.38 19.5      -51 21.5      -16.5 
brisk cold 5.852 5 2.71     3.25 58      76.5 -17.5      -36 
chill cold 8.185 5 2.96     3.92 -8.5      79.5 38.5      21 
cool cold 10.811 4 3.00     3.71 140.5      -13 33      33 
february cold 11.018 8 3.00     3.25 70.5      37 -11.5      18.5 
flurry cold 6.581 6 3.38     3.63 42.5      219 51.5      13 
freeze cold 8.645 6 4.08     4.58 62      48.5 9      5 
fridge cold 7.377 6 3.17     3.71 72      24.5 -81      -31.5 
frigid cold 5.694 6 3.88     4.08 -34      53 0      -60 
frosty cold 5.855 6 3.42     4.17 44      -5 23      -49.5 
frozen cold 8.95 6 4.33     4.54 -21      23 12      -24.5 
icy cold 9.255 3 3.92     4.46 114.5      -68 -48      -8 
january cold 10.482 7 3.21     3.13 102      38.5 5      38 
nippy cold 4.431 5 3.00     3.04 -63.5      23 -36      8 
numb cold 7.148 4 3.00     2.79 28.5      -46 -38      -41 
polar cold 8.203 5 4.33     4.08 7      47 46.5      33 
shiver cold 6.544 6 3.13     4.17 -22      71 -32.5      -34.5 
sleet cold 4.942 5 3.21     3.08 -15      66 -41.5      -8 
snowy cold 6.631 5 3.42     3.96 85      24.5 -10.5      13 
tundra cold 8.549 6 3.67     3.54 -12.5      -39 23.5      6.5 
windy cold 7.07 5 2.50     2.96 -56      36.5 -65.5     -70.5 
winter cold 10.082 6 4.04     4.46 24      30 -54.5      -20.5 
 M 7.711 5.625 3.44    3.78 28.13      30.81 -5.98     -11.63 
       
blaze hot 8.432 5 4.33     4.17 63.5      77 10      14.5 
boiling hot 8.032 7 4.63     4.58 35      11 -43      45.5 
broil hot 4.727 5 3.75     3.96 58      48.5 -49.5      51 
fever hot 8.336 5 3.46     4.13 67      22.5 66      88.5 
flame hot 10.453 5 4.58     4.58 -33      28 26      -12 
grill hot 7.31 5 3.58     4.08 113      65.5 27      50 
inferno hot 7.881 7 4.96     4.38 9      2 72      -1.5 
july hot 10.063 4 3.46     3.67 86     -19 17      7 
lava hot 7.922 4 4.83     4.83 112.5      33.5 31.5      9.5 
magma hot 6.17 5 4.75     4.75 8      109.5 83      19.5 
molten hot 6.458 6 4.83     4.13 13.5      .5 73      -9 
piping hot 6.988 6 4.29     3.33 36      55.5 -21.5      46 
roast hot 7.302 5 3.46     4.08 41      -32 50.5      53 
scald hot 4.745 5 4.46     3.96 54      -6 27.5      24 
scorch hot 5.242 6 4.63     4.17 49      15 41      35.5 
sear hot 5.58 4 3.96     3.54 40      39 -14      -72 
simmer hot 7.022 6 3.58     3.58 152.5      58.5 18.5      33 
spicy hot 6.742 5 3.96     3.96 84      30 43.5      28.5 
steam hot 8.562 5 3.92     4.08 -0.5      80 45.5      22.5 
summer hot 10.448 6 3.71     4.17 173      54 40      -15.5 
sun hot 11.213 3 4.46     4.67 58      55.5 -6.5      16.5 
torch hot 7.794 5 4.33     4.17 46      32 59      19.5 
tropical hot 8.977 8 4.17     4.08 26.5      96 -6      13.5 
volcano hot 8.024 7 4.88     4.42 -18.5      -44 59.5      57 
 M 7.684 5.375 4.21     4.14 53.06     33.85 27.08   21.81 
Note.  HAL = Hyperspace Analogue to Language (see Balota et al. 2007); M = mean. 
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Appendix C 
Characteristics of Temporal Word Stimuli 
Word Time  
Meaning 
Log 
Frequency 
HAL 
Length 
Association 
Rating (1-5 
scale) 
abrupt short 6.578 6 3.71 
accelerated short 8.122 11 3.96 
brief short 9.878 5 4.21 
dashing short 6.366 7 3.75 
fast short 11.252 4 4.54 
flashing short 7.903 8 3.75 
fleeting short 6.153 8 3.39 
hasty short 6.911 5 3.64 
hurry short 8.544 5 4.25 
immediate short 10.358 9 4.39 
instant short 9.165 7 4.43 
quick short 10.537 5 4.21 
racing short 9.621 6 4.07 
rapid short 9.119 5 4.46 
running short 11.886 7 3.79 
rushed short 7.757 6 4.39 
short short 11.467 5 4.14 
snappy short 6.787 6 4.07 
speedy short 7.302 6 4.46 
sudden short 9.075 6 4.18 
swift short 8.3 5 3.75 
transient short 7.202 9 2.54 
vanishing short 6.922 9 3.25 
zooming short 6.26 7 3.75 
 M 8.48 6.54 3.96 
constant long 9.802 8 3.82 
continual long 7.431 9 4.04 
delayed long 8.513 7 4.14 
enduring long 7.217 8 3.68 
eternal long 9.292 7 4.36 
extend long 9.146 6 3.89 
forever long 9.938 7 4.57 
freeze long 8.645 6 3.54 
gradual long 7.442 7 3.86 
infinite long 9.37 8 4.39 
lasting long 8.131 7 4.14 
lengthy long 8.104 7 4.43 
linger long 6.368 6 3.57 
pause long 8.48 5 3.64 
perpetual long 7.558 9 2.89 
persist long 7.361 7 3.25 
prolong long 6.486 7 4.29 
remain long 10.11 6 3.61 
slow long 10.686 4 4.64 
sluggish long 6.752 8 3.75 
stay long 10.8 4 3.61 
stuck long 9.971 5 3.32 
sustain long 8.042 7 3.61 
wait long 11.031 4 3.54 
 
